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Case No. 20100549-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, in the Interest of 
D.B., a person under eighteen (18) years of age. 
D.B., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to its grant of D.B.'s petition for writ of 
certiorari. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(a) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether a majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in affirming the 
juvenile court's judgment? Order of September 27,2010 ("Order," Addendum A). 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court will "'review the court of appeals' 
decision for correctness and give its conclusions of law no deference.'" State v. 
Cahoon, 2009 UT 9 , \ 10,203 P.3d 957 (citation omitted) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES, AND RULES1 
The following constitutional provision, statutes, and rules are set out at 
Addendum B: 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206 (West Supp. 2010), -404 (West 2004); 
Utah R. Juv. P. 44,46,47, and 48; 
Utah R. Civ. P. 46, 59, 60; 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 46. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State filed petitions alleging twelve instances of criminal conduct, 
including two allegations of burglary of a dwelling, two allegations of theft of items 
valued at $299 or less, one allegation each of theft of items valued at between $300 to 
$999, receiving stolen property under $300, criminal trespass, obstruction of justice, 
contempt probation, joyriding, driving without a valid driver's license, and failure 
to remain at the scene of an accident. Rl-2, 20-21,44,48-49, 50-51. 
1
 Citation of statutes is to the current Code. Although UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
6-206 (criminal trespass) was amended after D.B.'s commission of the offense, the 
amendment does not affect the disposition of this case. 
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On July 21,2008, the juvenile court heard evidence on the allegations of theft, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004) (Allegation 4), and of 
criminal trespass, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-206(2)(b) (West Supp. 
2010) (Allegation5). R20-21;266.3 On August 11,2008, the juvenile court found that 
both were true because D.B. acted as an accomplice. The juvenile court placed him 
on probation. R41-43; 67:4-8, 60-61. D.B. timely appealed to the court of appeals 
from an amended judgment, dated September 3,2008, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78A-4-103(2)(c) (West 2009). R41-43, 60. 
In the court of appeals, D.B. claimed that he had no notice before the juvenile 
court made its ruling that he would be tried as an accomplice and, therefore, he had 
no opportunity to object to the court's adjudication. Therefore, he argued, the court 
violated his due process right to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation. 
A majority of the court of appeals affirmed the juvenile court's adjudications 
of D.B/s guilt, holding that D.B. failed to preserve his challenge to the juvenile 
court's ruling by not filing an appropriate post-judgment motion. In re D.B., 2010 
UT App 111, I f 1-18, 231 P.3d 819 (Addendum C). 
The other allegations were heard on other dates and are not at issue in this matter. 
3
 The transcripts from July 21, 2008 (trial) and August 11, 2008 (disposition and 
sentencing) are not numbered, but are referred to as pages 66 and 67, respectively, in the 
Legal Index prepared by the Court Clerk. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The offense 
At trial, Jason Sessions, an employee of Applebee's, testified for the State. 
R66:6. Sessions was working at Applebee's on the morning of April 18,2008, when 
he saw "two individuals trying to break into a fence" and one climbed over the 
fence. R66:7. Sessions notified the police and then watched the two boys, J.M. and 
D.B., until the police arrived. R66:7,10,16,17. Sessions stated that the two boys 
were "hitting the fence padlock with either a rock or some type of bar." R66:8,13-
14. "Both tried to climb the fence and they both jumped off and then one of the 
Defendants climbed into the fence and . . . [went] around to the back of the trailer." 
R66:8. The other boy, who was unable to climb the fence, waited and acted as a 
"watch-out," "appeared to be nervous," and was "looking around." R66:9. Jason 
identified D.B. as the boy who climbed over the fence. R66:ll. 
J.M.'s involvement had already been adjudicated and he was completing 
court-order community service. R66:18-20, 31. Testifying for the State, J.M. stated 
that both he and D.B. jumped over the fence into the construction site. Id. at 20. He 
claimed that they did not try to break the lock on the fence before climbing over. 
R66:21, 26. He also stated that D.B. found the bolt cutters and told him to throw 
them outside the fence. R66:23, 25, 26, 28. J.M. insisted that he did not intend to 
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steal the bolt cutters, but believed D.B. intended to "take them and do something 
with them/7 R. 66:28. D.B., he said, then jumped back over the fence, at which point 
the police arrived. R66:24,34. 
When Tooele City Police Officers Marco Mihailovich and Steven Gowans 
arrived, J.M. was still inside the fence while D.B. was outside the fence, "not more 
than a few feet" away. Bolt cutters lay on the ground outside the fence. R66:34-38. 
The two boys told the officers that "they obtained [the] bolt cutters from inside of 
the construction site area." R66:35. 
The course of proceedings 
The petition alleged that D.B. committed theft and criminal trespass, without 
specifically alleging his role as an accomplice. 
Before trial, D.B. filed a discovery request in which he asked for documents 
containing statements of "the defendants" contained in police reports. R7. During 
cross-examination, J.M. insisted that he never intended to take the bolt cutters and 
that taking the bolt cutters was exclusively D.B/s idea and act R66:3-27-28. In 
response, referring to J.M/s report of the incident to the investigating officer (and 
before the officer had testified), D.B. asked: "Do you recall telling [the police officer] 
that you and [D.B] threw the bolt cutters over the fence?" Id. at 30 (emphasis 
added). D.B. immediately concluded his cross-examination when J.M. answered 
affirmatively. Id. 
5 
The State presented the case for D.B.'s guilt as a principal through the 
testimony of Jason Sessions, who testified that he witnessed only D.B. climb over the 
fence R66:7-9. But D.B. challenged that theory by asking Officer Mihailovich on 
cross-examination which of the juveniles was still inside the fenced area when the 
officer arrived at the scene. Id. at 36. When the officer was unable to respond, D.B. 
invited the officer to refresh his recollection by reviewing his police report. Id. D.B. 
then elicited that the officer found only him—D.B.— outside the fence, while J.M. 
remained within. Id. at 36-37. 
In closing, the prosecutor described how J.M. and D.B acted together in 
hitting the padlock on the fence and in stealing the bolt cutters. R66:40-42. In 
response, D.B. argued that the State's principal witness, Jason Sessions, clearly 
testified that only one person succeeded in climbing over the fence, but that when 
the police officers arrived they found him outside the fence and J.M. within. Id. at 
42-43. In light of J.M/s doubtful credibility, D.B. argued, these facts showed that he 
had not committed the criminal acts alleged in the petition. Id. at 43. In so arguing, 
he dismissed Jason's testimony as "pure speculation" that the individual outside the 
fence appeared to be acting as "a lookout." Id. 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor addressed D.B.'s disparagement of Jason Session's 
view that the individual outside the fence acted as a lookout: 
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But the problem that [D.B.'s counsel] has with this whole case is: No 
matter where [D.B.] was, it was clear, Jason Sessions says he was a 
lookout. He is the only independent witness we have on this case 
today. He thought he was a lookout, he was watching things, and so 
he's just as responsible for what his Co-defendant does as if he 
committed that crime. And he should be found guilty, Your Honor. 
R66:44. D.B. did not object to this characterization of his guilt. 
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court found that both J.M and D.B. 
had tried to climb over the fence, that only one of the juveniles entered the f enced-
off area, and that the other juvenile "appeared to be acting as a lookout/' R67:5. 
Discounting J.M.'s testimony—that both he and D.B. had climbed over the fence — 
and crediting the police officers' testimony —that when they arrived at the scene 
J.M. was inside, and D.B. was outside, the fenced-off area— the court adjudicated 
D.B. guilty of theft and criminal trespass specifically as an accomplice. Id. at 5-7. 
A majority of the court of appeals affirmed the juvenile court's adjudications. 
In re D.B., 2010 UT App 111, f f 1-18, 231 P.3d 819 (Addendum C). Judge Thorne 
wrote the lead opinion, in which he summarily affirmed the juvenile court's 
findings because D.B. had fair notice that he could be adjudicated on an accomplice 
liability theory based on the evidence and the State's closing argument. Id. at %^ 5-
12. Judge Bench was "willing to assume" that D.B. did not have fair notice that the 
State was relying on an accomplice liability theory before the juvenile court entered 
its ruling. Judge Bench agreed with Judge Thorne, however, that D.B. had failed to 
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preserve his claim for appeal by not filing a timely post-judgment motion. Id. at Tffl 
13-18 (Bench, J., concurring in result). Judge Davis dissented, opining that D.B. did 
not have prior notice of the State's accomplice liability theory and that a post-
judgment motion was neither necessary nor sufficient to preserve the issue for 
appeal. Id. at I f 19-38.4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
The majority of the court of appeals affirmed the juvenile court's 
adjudications because D.B. failed to preserve his challenge to those adjudications by 
not filing an appropriate post-judgment motion. D.B. mainly argues, however, that 
the court of appeals erred in failing to recognize that the juvenile court improperly 
relied on a theory of accomplice liability of which he had no reasonable notice at 
trial. D.B/s claim fails because its underlying premise —that he lacked sufficient 
notice of the State's accomplice liability theory to prepare a defense —is 
unsupported by the record. 
First, the court of appeals correctly recognized that an information is 
sufficient to alert a defendant to the "possibility" that accomplice liability will be 
raised at trial, even without express reference in the charge. D.B. received further 
notice of accomplice liability as the proceedings progressed. He received discovery 
The relevant portion of the disposition hearing is attached at Addendum D. 
which suggested this theory. At trial, witnesses testified that he aided his co-
defendant in attempting their unprivileged entry on private premises and by acting 
as a lookout. In closing, D.B. focused his argument to implicitly rebut the inference 
from the evidence that he acted, not as a principal in the offenses, but as an 
accomplice. Particularly, D.B. tried to disparage the testimony of the State's 
principal witness that he had acted as a "lookout" — the emblematic description of 
an accomplice. In closing rebuttal, and in evident response to D.B/s concluding 
remarks, the prosecutor argued that D.B. was guilty as an accomplice, all but 
naming his theory. The lead writer of the majority of the court of appeals correctly 
recognized that such proceedings provided D.B. with adequate notice that the State 
was pursuing an accomplice liability theory, providing D.B. with an opportunity to 
object and request a continuance if he needed more time to prepare a defense. D.B. 
did neither. Accordingly, D.B. failed to create any record that he was actually 
prejudiced. In any case, evidence of D.B/s guilt, either as a principal or an 
accomplice, was overwhelming. 
II. 
The majority of the court of appeals correctly determined that by not filing a 
post-judgment motion D.B. failed to preserve his claim that the juvenile court erred 
in adjudicating him guilty on the basis of accomplice liability. To preserve an issue 
for appeal an appellant must bring the issue to the lower court's attention so that the 
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court has an opportunity to consider the matter and, if error exists, correct it. If an 
appellant fails to take this step, his claim is ordinarily barred from consideration on 
appeal. In some instances, however, where, for example, the appellant has been 
surprised or some other ground justifies relief, the appellant may yet preserve his 
issue for appeal by filing a properly supported post-judgment motion. 
In this case, D.B. took neither of these crucial steps to preserve his claim that 
he never had notice that the State was pursuing an accomplice liability theory at 
trial or that the juvenile court might adjudicate him guilty on the basis of that 
theory. D.B. did not object in the trial court when both the evidence and the 
prosecutor's use of it clearly signaled that he was subject to being adjudicated guilty 
as an accomplice. Similarly, when the juvenile court later adjudicated him guilty as 
an accomplice, D.B. remained silent. However, because D.B. claimed he was 
surprised by the State's and the court's application of accomplice liability, D.B. 
could have moved for a new trial or relief from the judgment through properly 
supported post-judgment motions as provided by the Rules of Juvenile Procedure. 
Because the filing of one of these post-judgment motions was the only remaining 
means whereby D.B. could preserve his claim for appeal, and because D.B. failed to 
take this vital step, the majority of the court of appeals correctly held that D.B. failed 
to preserve his claim for appeal. It therefore properly affirmed without considering 
the merits of D.B.'s claim. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Court granted D.B/s petition to answer the following issue: "Whether a 
majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in affirming the juvenile court's 
judgment." Order of September 27,2010 (Addendum A). D.B. correctly recognizes 
that "the majority opinion" of the court of appeals "only ruled in favor of the State 
based upon [his] failure to preserve the [adequacy-of-notice] issue by filing a post-
judgment motion." Pet. Br. at 6. D.B. nevertheless principally argues before this 
Court that he did not have notice that the State intended to pursue a case of 
accomplice liability sufficient for him to defend against it or to alert him to the 
possibility that the juvenile court might adjudicate his case based on accomplice 
liability. Pet. at 6-12. This latter argument would appear uncalled-for given the 
certified question. The State nevertheless addresses this issue because its discussion 
puts in the proper perspective the full extent to which Defendant failed to preserve 
his underlying claim of defective notice of accomplice liability. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
D.B. RECEIVED ADEQUATE NOTICE, BEFORE AND DURING 
TRIAL, THAT HE COULD BE FOUND GUILTY FOR THEFT 
AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS AS AN ACCOMPLICE AND THUS 
HAD AN OPPORTUNITY AND A DUTY TO OBJECT BY FILING 
AN APPROPRIATE POST-JUDGMENT MOTION 
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D.B. claims that because he had no notice at any time before the juvenile court 
ruled that he would be tried as an accomplice, the court prejudicially violated his 
due process right to "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" when it 
concluded that he was guilty of the charged offenses as an accomplice. Pet. Br. at 6-
12. The claim is unsupported by the record and the law. 
A. D.B. was on notice that he would be tried as an accomplice. 
Throughout his argument that the juvenile court lacked authority to 
adjudicate him guilty based on accomplice liability, D.B. self-servingly asserts that 
neither he nor the juvenile court had notice from the State that the prosecution was 
based on accomplice liability. Pet. Br. at 7-11. That argument fails because the 
record abundantly shows that D. B. had sufficient notice to prepare a defense with 
respect to that theory. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that an accused "shall... be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation " U.S. Const, amend. VI. See In re Oliver, 333 
U.S. 257,273 (1948) ("A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, 
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense — a right to his day in court—are basic 
in our system of jurisprudence."). The pleading's "most basic purpose... is 'to fairly 
J L L L L U I l l l U. U . \ ^ i V ^ . i l U . U l U V A U L C V~A ICLA CL V_ W t l U U U t J l l U l l , U-IH-i-UM- U^H^H^-k^ W . A A^iV i H H l l l I, J \J\J A .X-Ci 
175, 182 (5th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165,1169 (5th 
Cir.1986)). See also 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., Criminal Procedure §19.2(c) (3d ed. 
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2008) [hereinafter Criminal Procedure] ("the pleading must'fairly inform' the accused 
of charges against him"). D.B. received adequate notice in several ways. 
1. D.B, received notice of the possibility of accomplice liability 
from the petition, as a matter of law, 
D.B. assumes at the outset that because the petition alleging the offenses did 
not mention accomplice liability, he was not given the required constitutional notice. 
Pet. Br. at 6. That assumption is mistaken. 
"[A] person charged with a crime has adequate notice of the possibility of 
accomplice liability being raised at trial because conviction of accomplice and 
principal liability do not require proof of different elements or proof of different 
quality." State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, f 12,56 P.3d 969 (rejecting "contention 
that an accomplice liability instruction would be unfair because it represents a 
charge completely separate from principal liability for murder") (emphasis added). 
Thus, the court of appeals in Gonzales held that "[w]e do not agree that accomplice 
liability is a separate offense from principal liability such that it would require 
specific notice." Id. Other courts have agreed that notice of the possibility of 
accomplice liability is adequate notice for constitutional purposes. See e.g., State v. 
Mancine, 590 A.2d 1107, 1120-1121 (NJ. 1991) (rejecting claim of surprise where 
record developed through discovery and trial would have provided adequate notice 
of "possibility" of charge under theory of accomplice liability). 
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Here, the petition alleged that D.B. had committed theft and criminal trespass, 
without specifically alleging his role as an accomplice. R20-21. As discussed below, 
however, the responses to D.B.'s discovery request and evidence developed at trial 
suggested that D.B. acted either as a principal or as an accomplice in stealing the 
bolt cutters. Resp. Br. at I. A.3. But in finding that D.B. committed criminal trespass 
and theft by aiding J.M., the juvenile court expressly cited to Gonzales' observation 
that accomplice and principal liability do not require separate and distinct notice in 
the information, and to Utah's accomplice liability statute — UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-
202 (West 2004). R67:6-7. Thus, even without the evidence of accomplice liability 
suggested through discovery and developed at trial, the allegations were sufficient 
to put D.B. on notice that accomplice liability might be raised at trial. Gonzales, 2002 
UT App 256,112. 
2. D.B. received notice of the possibility of accomplice liability 
through discovery. 
In assessing whether a defendant has sufficient notice of a charge or theory, 
courts have moved beyond the four corners of the pleading form and have looked to 
"(1) the actual notice provided in light of the totality of the information available to 
the defendant and (2) the likelihood of the defendant having actually been 
prejudiced in defending against the charges." Criminal Procedure at §19.2(c). "As 
long as a defendant is sufficiently apprised of the State's evidence upon which the 
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charge is based so that the defendant can prepare to meet that case, the 
constitutional requirement is fulfilled/7 State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1032 n.l (Utah 
1991). Thus, "[d]ue process requirements may be satisfied if a defendant receives 
actual notice of the charges against him, even if the indictment or information is 
deficient. " Hulstine v. Morris, 819 F.2d 861, 864 (8th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original); Calderon v. Prunty, 59 F.3d 1005,1009 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We 
have also recognized that a defendant can be adequately notified of the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him by means other than the charging document/') 
In determining whether a defendant received adequate notice to satisfy due process 
requirements, a court "will look to the 'four corners' of the Information together 
with all material that was made available to a defendant. . . through discovery." 
Parker v. State, 917 P.2d 980,986 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996). See also Mancine, 590 A.2d 
at 1120-1121 (adequacy of notice through discovery and trial record). Any shifts in 
the theory stated in the pleading should thus be considered in light of "whether the 
defendant had an earlier warning of the impending shift in light of 'all the 
information supplied to him or her by the State/" Criminal Procedure at n. 27. 
Before trial, D.B. filed a discovery request in which he asked for documents 
containing statements of "the defendants" contained in police reports. R7. From his 
cross-examination of J.M., it is evident that D.B. received a police report in response 
to his discovery request. R66:30. From that report, D.B. knew that J.M. had told the 
15 
police that "[J.M.] and [D.B] threw the bolt cutters over the fence." Id. (emphasis 
added). From J.M/s statement to the police that he and D.B. had acted together in 
stealing the bolt cutters, D.B. would have been aware that his involvement in the 
offenses as an accomplice might reasonably be raised at trial. D.B. also used the 
report to refresh Officer Mihailovich's recollection that when the officer arrived at 
the scene he found D.B. outside, and J.M inside, the fenced area. Id. at 36-37. Such 
evidence, received before trial in response to D.B/s own discovery requests and 
which suggested that D.B. might have played a lesser role in the offenses, would by 
its nature have given notice that the prosecution might proceed on the basis of 
accomplice liability. 
3. Evidence presented at trial and D.B/s closing argument plainly 
signaled that he understood that the prosecution might render 
him culpable as an accomplice. 
D.B. repeatedly asserts that he had absolutely no notice that his culpability 
might be prosecuted or adjudicated on the basis of accomplice liability, because the 
State's case was presented exclusively on the basis of principal liability. Pet. Br. at 6, 
8-12. However, the evidence presented at trial and D.B/s closing argument, 
presented before the prosecutor expressly expanded the State's theory to include 
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See Commonwealth v. Smith, 482 A.2d 1124,1126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (despite being 
charged only as principal, defendant had sufficient notice of potential for 
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accomplice liability theory, where evidence adduced at trial supported accomplice 
theory, defendant attempted to transfer criminal liability to other person, and 
Commonwealth had not misled defendant). 
The evidence at trial and D.B/s closing argument, viewed in light of Utah's 
party liability statute, clearly show that D.B. was on n ltire that he , ould be 
adjudicated based on a theory of accomplice liability. The statute provides that, 
[e]very person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense wrho directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (West 2004). 
Some of the evidence at trial was conflicting as to precisely who or how many 
boys climbed over the fence. Jason Sessions, the Applebee's employee, testified that 
only one boy succeeded in going over the fence and that that boy was D.B. R66:7, 
11. In contrast, J .M., D.B/s partner, testified that both he and D.B. climbed over the 
fence. Id. at 20. The discrepancy in those testimonies put in doubt what precise role 
D.B. played in the criminal trespass and theft of the bolt cutters. 
But some testimony was not discrepant with any other testimony and 
i :~x.~i-i i_~ J T ^ T> '~ LZ~I XJ. :— i.1 ££ i : ^ ^ r^L£: 
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Mihailovich testified that when he arrived on the scene, J.M. was inside the fenced 
area and D.B. was outside. Id. at 34-38. More importantly, Jason testified that the 
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boy who was unable to climb the fence "appeared to be nervous/' was "looking 
around/' and appeared to act as a "watch-out" — a lookout R66:9. 
The "lookout" is the quintessential example of an accomplice. See WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § I3.2(a)(20l0) (recognizing as "[s]omewhat 
easier" in identifying accomplice liability than situations involving an actor's "mere 
presence "are those cases in which the liability of the accomplice is based upon the 
fact that he actually did 'aid/ 'abet/ or 'assist' in the commission of the crime," i.e., 
by "act[ing] as a lookout") (citations omitted). See also American Fork City v. Rothe, 
2000 UT App 277, t1f 2, 9-10, 12 P.3d 108 (upholding conviction based on 
accomplice liability where evidence showed defendant actively looked up and 
down store aisles, apparently acting as lookout, while companion stole items off 
grocery store shelves). C/. In re M.B., 2008 UT App 433, TJ1f 7-12,198 P.3d 1007, 618 
(holding evidence suggesting criminal involvement insufficient to prove guilt as 
accomplice absent evidence that juvenile behaved as lookout during burglary). 
Here, D.B. plainly recognized that evidence that he stood outside the fenced 
area while acting as a lookout signaled that he might be adjudicated as an 
accomplice in the offenses. D.B.'s final remark in closing was to dismiss Jason's 
testimony as "pure speculation" that the individual outside the fence appeared to 
act as "a lookout." Id. This final argument had a purpose. A lookout cannot be 
convicted of an offense as a principal because, by definition, the nature of his 
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complicity precludes his having directly committed the actus reus of the offense. 
Accordingly, the only reason for D.B. to disparage the evidence that he acted as a 
lookout was to rebut the inescapable inference that as a lookout he was guilty as an 
accomplice. In short, D.B. knew before the conclusion of the State's case that he 
might be adjudicated guilty as an accomplice and lie prepared lor thai possible 
outcome by disparaging the critical evidence. 
4 D.B. received clear notice that the case might be adjudicated 
based on accomplice liability from the prosecutor's closing 
rebuttal. 
As discussed, substantia] testimony would have put i ^ r; on.e that the 
prosecutor, apparently having first sought to prove D.B/s guilt as a principal, would 
have to enlarge his theory to include D.B/s guilt as an accomplice. Indeed, D.B/s 
closing argument virtually invited the prosecutor to do so. And the prosecutor 
responded accordingly. In closing rebuttal, all but naming his theory, the 
prosecutor argued that D.B. should be found guilty as an accomplice: 
But the problem that [D.B/s counsel] has with this whole case is: No 
matter where [D.B.] was, it was clear, Jason Sessions says he was a 
lookout. He is the only independent witness we have on this case 
today. He thought he was a lookout, he was watching things, and so he's just 
as responsible for what his Co-defendant does as if lie committed that crime. 
And he should be found guilty, Your Honor. 
R66:44 (emphasis added). 
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The foregoing statement gave clear notice that the prosecutor was alternately 
submitting the case to the court based on accomplice liability. To vaguely suggest, 
as Judge Bench did in his concurring opinion, that the prosecutor's statement might 
not constitute "fair notice that the State was relying on a theory of accomplice 
liability," see In re D.B., 2010 UT App 111, *[  13, is to elevate form over substance. 
That the prosecution was clearest in announcing its alternative theory in rebuttal 
does not detract from the adequacy of this express notice to prepare a defense in this 
case. And even if it were, at that point, D.B. could have asked the court for a 
continuance or for leave to testify in his own defense. See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 
1208, 1215 (Utah 1987) ("[Wjhenever the prosecution changes its position, a 
defendant may seek a continuance"). The juvenile court would likely have granted 
the request, if D.B. had been able to show genuine surprise. See Utah R. Juv. P. 44(c) 
(authorizing court to dismiss petition during or at the conclusion of the adjudicatory 
hearing in interest of justice); Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah,1983), 
abrogated on other grounds by Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115,119 (Utah 
1998) (observing that trial court has discretion to grant motion to reopen case for 
taking additional testimony after case has been submitted but before entry of 
judgment, "in the interest of fairness and substantial justice''"). In any event, D.B/s 
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failure to make such a request after hearing the prosecutor expressly argue his guilt 
as an accomplice only emphasizes his failure to preserve the issue for appeal.5 
11 D.B. has failed to make a record showing he was prejudiced by the 
alleged inadequate notice. 
Notwithstanding his apprehension of the risk that he might be found guilty as 
an accomplice —evidenced by his closing argument—D.B. argues that he did not 
testify because he did not have notice that the court might consider accomplice 
liability. Pet. Br. at 8, If he had such notice, D.B. argues, "he would have taken the 
5
 D.B. argues that the court of appeals erred in not considering his argument 
that, in the absence of the prosecutor's formally amending the charging document, 
the juvenile court did not have authority to unilaterally amend the petition to 
include a theory of accomplice liability. Pet. Br. at 9-10. As D.B. acknowledges, that 
issue was not addressed by any judge of the court of appeals, much less the 
majority. Therefore, that issue is not before this Court now. See Order (Addendum 
A). Additionally, the point is inadequately briefed. See West Jordan City v. Goodman, 
2006 UT 27,11 29-30,135 P.3d 874 (stating that a "brief must go beyond providing 
conclusory statements and 'fully identify, analyze, and cite its legal arguments,"and 
declining to review the merits of a claim so inadequately briefed)(citations omitted). 
D.B. cites no relevant authority that for the juvenile court to rule on the basis of 
accomplice liability the charging document must first be amended where, as here, 
partial reliance on the expanded theory of accomplice liability does not alter the 
offense charged. Indeed, D.B/s argument relies on the unbriefed assumption that 
the prosecution of any charge is fundamentally altered by a prosecution based on 
accomplice liability. It does not. See Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, f^ 12. Similarly, 
D.B. provides no argument or authority that in a bench trial a court lacks authority 
to rule on the basis of accomplice liability where the prosecutor expressly relies on 
that theory in open court. Indeed, in this bench trial, the prosecutor's expression 
_.. .- i t. . -_ i_ £ 1 i_- LJL 2 «-,«. i_.2 ~1 C C±~±~ J A 77 ' * ! T r T r 7 
was tan tamount tu a request iur an JJLLSLLULUUIL ILL a jury uiai. occ oiuic u. white, 0/ / 
P.2d 552, 554 (Utah 1978) (upholding request for accomplice liability instruction, 
supported by evidence at trial, against asserted ground that defendant had been 
charged and tried as a principal and not as an accomplice). The Court should 
therefore decline to consider this component of D.B/s claim. 
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stand and testified that [1] in fact he had not crossed over into the construction yard 
because he did not want to be associated with the crime that his co-defendant was 
committing," and [2] "the reason that he did not pick up the bolt cutters or even get 
close to them was because he wanted no part of the theft/' Pet. Br. at 9. Had the 
juvenile court heard his testimony, D.B. argues, it would likely have found him not 
guilty. Id. The argument fails because not only is it unsupported by any record, but 
also because his testimony would not likely have resulted in a different outcome. 
"Appellants bear the burden of proof with respect to their appeals, including 
the burdens attending the preservation and presentation of the record/' State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17,12 P.3d 92 (citations omitted). "[W]hen an appellant 
fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, [the appellate court] presume[s] the 
regularity of the proceedings below." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24,113,69 R3d 1278 
(holding that "absent a record, this court is in no position to review the trial court's 
subsequent [ruling].") See also Horton v. Gem State Mut, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah 
App. 1990) (stating that where appellant fails to provide transcript, "we are unable 
to ascertain whether the trial court's findings were based upon sufficient evidence," 
and therefore appellant's "claim of error is merely an unsupported, unilateral 
allegation which we cannot resolve"). 
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Here, D.B. has failed to develop any record that he would actually have 
testified as he now claims. Without such a record, this Court cannot even consider 
his claim of prejudice. Pntcliett, 2003 UT 24, % 13. 
D.B. implicitly argues that he could not have developed a record when he 
asserts that he had "no opportunity to request a continuance, because [heJ had no 
notice that the court would even consider accomplice liability." Pet Br at 9. (citing 
Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, f 13, for its notation that a defendant believing he has 
been prejudiced for lack of adequate notice of the charge may request a 
continuance). As argued above, however, D.B. received clear notice that the 
prosecution was relying on accomplice liability both during trial and in closing 
argument. Thus, D.B. was in a position to timely request a continuance, a reopening 
of the case, or any other appropriate remedy allowed under the rules. See Utah R. 
Juv. P. 44(c). D.B, did not move for any of these remedies, and therefore, cannot 
now be heard to complain that he was prejudiced. See Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1215-16 
("failure of a defendant to seek a continuance negates any claim of surprise and 
amounts to a waiver of any claim of variance") (citation omitted). Moreover, as 
argued below, see Resp. Br. at II. D.B. failed to object or make a record through any 
other of the means available to him, such as insisting on being heard, in the interest 
of justice, at the disposition hearing (Utah R. Juv. P. 46(a)); moving for a review 
hearing for cause (Utah R. Juv. P. 47(b)(1), -(2)); moving, based on surprise, for a 
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new trial (Utah R. Juv. P. 48); or requesting relief, for any good reason, from the 
operation of the judgment (Utah R. Juv. P. 48). In short, D.B. has left the court of 
appeals and this Court with no basis for reviewing his claim of prejudice, and 
therefore, the claim should be summarily rejected. 
But even without a record D.B/s premise — that he would have testified as he 
now proffers if he had received notice that he was subject to adjudication as an 
accomplice — rings hollow for testimony that he did not want to be associated with 
his co-defendant or the theft equally rebuts his culpability as a principal. 
In any event, there is no reasonable likelihood that the juvenile court would 
have found that the State failed to prove the allegations if D.B. had testified. A 
neutral witness, whom the court found most credible, see R67:6, testified that he saw 
both boys repeatedly pound the padlock on the fence with a rock or a bar and try to 
climb the fence. R66:8, 13-14. And this testimony was consistent with and 
bolstered by J.M.'s testimony that both he and D.B. climbed over the fence. Id. at 20. 
Thus, there was substantial evidence that D.B. was guilty as a principal. However, 
Jason Sessions also testified that the boy who was unable to climb the fence 
appeared to act as a lookout Id. at 9. Further, it was undisputed that D.B. was 
outside the fenced area and that J.M. was inside when the police arrived at the scene 
and that both of them admitted to taking the bolt cutters. Id. at 34-38. Thus, there 
was also substantial evidence that D.B. was guilty of the offenses as an accomplice. 
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Against this evidence, D.B. argues that the result would likely have been 
different if he had taken the stand to essentially testify only that he did not go into 
the yard or go near the bolt cutters because he did not want to be associated with his 
friend's misdeeds. Pet. Br. at 8. But the trial court already had substantial reasons 
to doubt D.B/s general credibility. At the time of trial, D.B. was before the cour t on 
allegations of two other thefts, two burglaries of a dwelling, and receiving stolen 
property, offenses committed in three other criminal episodes. Rl-2,17-18. At the 
time of the disposition hearing, D.B, was before the court on an allegation of 
obstruction of justice, which was later dismissed only because he admitted an 
allegation of joyriding. R44, 55. The number and nature of the alleged offenses 
plainly spoke to D.B/s untrustworthy character, facts the court could hardly have 
disregarded in hearing D.B/s alleged testimony. On appeal, D.B. provides no 
record or argument as to why the juvenile court would likely have believed his 
purported testimony over this evidence. In sum, D.B. has failed to show that he was 
prejudiced by not testifying. 
THE MAJORITY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY 
DETERMINED THAT D.B. FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS CLAIM 
THAT THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING 
HIM GUILTY ON THE BASIS OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY 
D.B. argues that the majority of the court of appeals erred in concluding that, 
having failed to object to the juvenile court's ruling adjudicating him guilty as an 
accomplice, he could nevertheless have preserved his claim by filing a post-
judgment motion. Pet. Br. at 12. In essence, he argues that a defendant need not 
object at any point to a theory that, he asserts, surprised and thereby prejudiced him 
to preserve that claim for appeal. Nor does D.B. acknowledge that to obtain review 
of an unpreserved claim on appeal he must argue an exception to the preservaton 
rules, such as plain error. D.B/s argument flies in the face of the policies underlying 
the preservation rule, the governing rules of law, and the record in this case.6 
A. The adjudication of the juvenile court and the majority opinion of 
the court of appeals. 
Three weeks after the evidentiary hearing the juvenile court announced its 
adjudication. The court first reviewed the witnesses' testimony, noting those points 
in which their testimony harmonized or was discrepant. R67:4-6. The court 
resolved any conflict by identifying what appeared to be the best established, 
credible description of the events: D.B. and J.M were both seen to have pounded on 
the lock securing the fenced area; bolt cutters were taken from a trailer within the 
fenced area; D.B. and the bolt cutters were outside the fenced area when the officers 
6
 In fact, a plain error claim is unavailable to D.B. The court of appeals 
refused to address D.B/s claim because it was first raised in his reply brief. See In re 
U.B., 2010 UT App 111, % 7 n.6. While insisting that the court of appeals should 
have addressed his claim concerning the juvenile court's reliance on accomplice 
liability, D.B. does not argue before this Court that the majority of the court of 
appeals erred in refusing to his address the claim under plain error or ask this Court 
to do so. 
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arrived on the scene; and the State's main witness, Jason Sessions, testified that the 
boy who remained outside the fence appeared to act as a lookout. Id. 
Based on those salient facts, the juvenile court adjudicated D.B. guilty of the 
offenses, specifically as an accomplice. Id. at 6-7. In so ruling, the court expressly 
relied on Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, to support its view that I) U had received 
adequate notice of the State's accomplice liability theory. Relying on this Court's 
decision in State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 52, ^ 21-26,609 Utah Adv. Rep 33, superseded by, 
2008 UT 75,197 P.3d 628 (Amended Opinion), the court also determined that D.B. 
showed the requisite intent to support finding him guilty of the charged offenses as 
an accomplice. Id. at 6-7. 
D.B. did not object to any part of the court's ruling. R67; see also In re D.B., 
2010 UT App 111, f 11. Nor did D.B. opt to file any of the post-judgment motions 
available to him under the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, by which he might 
have asked the court for relief based on his claim of surprise. Id. at 10. Rather, D.B. 
first made his lack-of-notice claim, both as to the State's use of the evidence at trial 
and the juvenile court's reliance on accomplice liability, for the first time on direct 
appeal. Id. at 13. As noted, supra n.6, D.B. failed to adequately raise his claim 
under the plain error doctrine. Further, D.B. has at no point claimed that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the adjudications on the ground of accomplice 
liability. 
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A majority of the court of appeals affirmed the juvenile court's adjudications 
of D.B/s guilt. In re D.B., 2010 UT App 111, t l 1-18 (Addendum C). In the lead 
opinion, Judge Thorne wrote that by not filing a post-judgment motion, D.B. 
deprived the juvenile court of an opportunity to rule on his claim that he lacked 
notice of the State's accomplice liability theory and that he was thereby unable to 
respond to that theory. Id. at ^110-11 (citing availability of Utah R. Juv. P. 44,47, 
and 48(a)). Although Judge Thorne wrote that "a party is not required to file a post-
judgment motion before the trial court as a prerequisite to filing an appeal," see id. at 
If 10 n.10 (citing Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, ^ [ 15-16,2 P.3d 442), he concluded 
that by depriving the juvenile court of the opportunity to address and correct the 
claimed error at any point in the proceedings, D.B. failed to preserve his claim for 
appeal. Id. at f 11. 
Judge Bench was more emphatic in identifying D.B.'s failure to preserve his 
claim, at least at the point the juvenile court adjucated D.B. guilty on the express 
ground of accomplice liability. Id. at % 13. Judge Bench noted that "[i]ssues 'not 
raised before the trial court may not be raised [for the first time] on appeal.'" Id. at % 
14 (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, % 11,10 P.3d 346). He then recited the 
fundamental policy behind the preservation rule —to give the trial court a fair 
opportunity to rule on it. Id. (citing 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, j^ 
51, 99 P.3d 801). Following Judge Thome's observation that it would have been 
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appropriate for D.B. to raise the issue of notice of accomplice liability in a post-
judgment motion, Judge Bench identified specific rules under which D.B. could 
have expressly argued "surprise," "irregularity in the proceedings... preventing... 
a fair trial," or "any other reason justifying relief." Id. at f 15 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 
59(a)(1), 60(b); Utah R. Juv. P. 48 (a)). After distinguishing the cases cited by the 
dissent, Judge Bench concluded that not only would a post-judgment have been 
appropriate, "it was necessary for [D.B.] to raise the issue in a post-judgment 
motion" to preserve it for appeal Id. at f 17. This analysis is correct. 
B. I o preserve an issue for appeal, the moving party must present the 
issue to the lower court in a manner that allows it to consider the 
alleged error, and, if need be, correct it. 
This Court has "consistently held that a defendant who fails to preserve an 
objection at trial will not be able to raise that objection on appeal unless he is able to 
demonstrate either plain error or exceptional circumstances." State v. King, 2006 UT 
3, f 13,131 P.3d 202 (citing State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, % 9, 46 P.3d 230; Monson v. 
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,1022 (Utah 1996)). This preservation rule "applies to every 
claim, including constitutional questions." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111,10 P.3d 
346. "' [I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [,] the issue must be presented to the 
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issue/" 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, | 51, 99 P.3d 801 (quoting 
Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48,114,48 P.3d 968 (citing Badger 
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v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)) (emphasis added). "This 
requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for 
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding/7 Id. (citing Badger, 966 P.2d 
at 847). 'Tor a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error '(1) the 
issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised [,] 
and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority.'" Id. (quoting Brookside, 2002 UT 48,114,48 P.3d 968 (quoting Badger, 966 
P.2dat847). 
This rule is also designed to "inhibit a defendant from 'forego [ing] . . . an 
objection with the strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal and 
then, if that strategy fails,... claiming on appeal that the [c]ourt should reverse/" 
King, 2006 UT 3, | 13. (citation omitted). "Stated another way, under [Utah's] 
preservation rule, '"defendants are . . . not entitled to both the benefit of not 
objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal/"" Id. (quoting Cram, 2002 
UT 37,110, quoting State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)). 
C. The majority correctly determined that D.B. failed to preserve his 
argument for appeal. 
D.B. acknowledges that" [tjhere is no question that a defendant must raise an 
issue or objection during trial in order to preserve it." Pet. Br. at 11. "However," he 
claims, "that rule of law is irrelevant here, because there was no issue to preserve 
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during trial/' Id. The discussion in Point LB. — describing both D.B.'s and the 
prosecutor's recognition in closing arguments that D.B.'s acting as a lookout 
implicated him as an accomplice — shows that contention to be patently inaccurate. 
Resp. Br. <i i" f Bui D.B.'s disingenuousness contin ue;- „ for having acknowledged the 
preservation rule, he then essentially argues that because some authorities hold that 
the filing of a post-judgment motion does not preserve an issue for appeal he was 
relieved of any duty to alert the juvenile court that he was surprised and prejudiced 
when it adjudicated him guilty as an accomplice. Pet. Br. at 12-13. In making this 
argument, D.B, cites no legal authority relieving him of the duty to object to the 
juvenile court's ruling; rather he disregards that when the juvenile court announced 
the basis of its ruling, he was required to object if he considered the legal ground of 
the ruling unfounded or a surprise. See In re D.M., 2006 UT App 319U *1 (finding 
claim that juvenile court erred by not allowing cross-examination was unpreserved 
because no request was made for such examination). Under the basic rules for 
preserving any claim of error, D.B.'s failure to timely object in the juvenile court 
waived his claim on appeal, unless, as the majority held, D.B. preserved his claim 
through an appropriate post-judgment motion. 
in support ot his position that a post-judgment motion does not preserve an 
issue for appeal, D.B. cites two cases, also relied on by the dissent. Pet. Br. at 12-13. 
See In re D.B., 2010 UT App 111, 1j 36 (Davis, P.J., dissenting). Citing Sittner v. 
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Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 2 P.3d 442, D.B. writes that "although the general rule that 
failure to raise an argument before the trial court precludes a party from raising it 
on appeal, 'this rule does not require a party to file a post-judgment motion before 
the trial court as a prerequisite to filing an appeal/" Pet. Br. at 12-13 (citing Sittner, 
2000 UT 45, f 16). However, as Judge Bench pointed out, the party there had 
already preserved the appellate issues in motions and pleadings filed earlier, 
making a post-judgment motion superfluous. In re D.B., 2010 UT App 111, Tf 16 
(Bench, J., citing Sittner, 2000 UT 45,117). 
Citing State v. Erickson, 111 P.2d 756 (Utah 1986), wherein the defendant filed 
a post-judgment motion after failing to timely raise his claim in a motion to 
suppress, D.B. notes that "the [Erickson] court ruled that [filing the post-judgment 
motion] did not preserve the point for appeal." Pet. Br. at 13 (citing Erickson, 711 
P.2d at 759). D.B. also cites Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675 (Utah App. 
1995), wherein the defendant also failed to timely object at the time the lower court 
issued its summary judgment ruling, for the same essential rule: "'Raising an issue 
in a post-trial motion . . . does not preserve the issue for appeal/" Pet. Br. at 13 
(quoting Estate of Covington, 888 P.2d at 678). 
Contrary to D.B/s assertion, as Judge Bench points out, "[these] cases . . . do 
not stand for the proposition that a post-judgment motion is unnecessary or 
insufficient to preserve issues for appeal." Rather, they simply hold that a post-
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judgment motion is superfluous, and therefore inadequate, to preserve an already-
perserved claim or that a post-judgment motion, not identified by rule or law as 
providing an avenue of specific relief, is inadequate to preserve an issue that was 
not earlier brought to the attention of the trial court. 
But unlike the defendants in both Erickson and Estate of Covington, D.B. did 
have an available legal route by which, in his alleged circumstances, he could have 
preserved his claim for appeal even after he failed to timely object to the juvenile 
court's ruling. And because D.B. deprived the juvenile court of the opportunity to 
correct any error at the moment it announced its ruling, the only remaining way to 
preserve his claim for appeal was to follow that available route. Specifically, the 
Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide that "[n]ew hearings shall be available in 
accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 52, 59, and 60." Utah R. Juv. P. 48(a) (emphasis 
added). Rule 59(a)(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a party to move for a 
new trial based on "surprise."7 Similarly, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides relief from an order for "mistake," "surprise," "or any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
7
 As noted by Judge Bench and as set forth in this brief, see Addendum B, the 
State cited additional rules by which D.B. could have sought post-judgment relief. 
In re D.B., 2010 UT App 111, f 15 n.l. The majority, however, relied primarily on 
the application of rules 59 and 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as permitted by 
rule 48(a), Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, in concluding that D.B. failed to 
preserve his issue for appeal. Id. at ^ 10,15. 
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Based on D.B/s alleged claim that he had been surprised by both the State's 
use of an accomplice liability theory at trial and the juvenile court's application of 
that theory in adjudicating him guilty, the juvenile court would have been required 
to hear D.B/s claim upon his submission of a properly supported motion. By not 
filing such a motion, D.B. deprived the juvenile court of any opportunity to 
consider, and if need be, correct, the error he claimed for the first time on appeal. 
Defendant's final complaint, that "[tjhere was no such opportunity in this matter," 
see Pet. Br. at 14, thus disregards the law and the record in this case, which show 
that he failed to preserve his issue for appeal. 
Although not argued by D.B., a casual reading of Sittner, like D.B/s gloss of 
Erickson and Estate of Covington, might suggest that a new trial motion under rule 59 
is inadequate to preserve an issue for appeal. A deeper perusal yields precisely the 
opposite result in the circumstances of this case. In Sittner, the Court cited Dugan v. 
Jones, for the proposition that '"It is settled that . . . a rule 59 motion is [not] a 
condition precedent to appeal from a final judgment/" Sittner, 2000 UT 45, f^ 16 
(quoting Dugan, 724 P.2d 955, 956 (Utah 1986)(per curiam)(additional citation 
omitted) (bracket in original). But the full quotation from Dugan is: "A motion for a 
new trial is not a prerequisite for an appeal from a judgment; and on such appeal 
review may be had of any legal error, properly raised, that appears in the record, 
whether the action be a jury or court action." Dugan, 724 P.2d at 956 (quoting 6 A J. 
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MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59.15[3] (2d ed. 1986)) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
more complete exposition of Dugan inferentially supports the State's thesis: All 
claimed errors must be raised in the trial court, only those matters appearing in the 
record may be considered on appeal, and if claims are so preserved then a motion 
for a new trial is unnecessary. Commenting on a matter, "properly raised/7 Moore's 
Federal Practice states, "[w]hile Rule 46 makes formal exceptions to rulings or order 
of the court unnecessary, it does require a party, as a general proposition, to make 
known the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of 
the court and his grounds therefor/7 6 A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59.15[3] n.2 
(2d ed. 1986). Discussing rule 46, Moore's Federal Practice states: 
This rule has a clear notice function. The purpose of the Rule 
46 requirement is to allow the court an immediate opportunity to 
reconsider its action and correct any error. Since the failure to 
object to an action by the court will generally preclude appellate 
review of that action, a party is not permitted silently to await a 
favorable outcome and then assert objections to previous trial 
court actions if the outcome is not favorable. 
12 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 46.02 (3d ed. 2010). 
Moore's Federal Practice goes on to make still clearer the State's thesis in 
support of the majority opinion: 
However, a motion for a new trial is a prerequisite to appeal when the 
relief is sought on the basis of matter not appearing in the record, 
such as newly discovered evidence, which is within the scope of a 
motion for a new trial. Such motion usually must first be made in 
the trial court. 
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6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59.15[3] (2d ed. 1986) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). The current edition of Moore's Federal Practice essentially 
recites the same view; "Grounds for a new trial that arise solely in the context of 
post trial proceedings must be presented to the trial court for consideration by a motion for 
a new trial, and the failure to do so deprives the appellate court from any record that 
is reviewable for error/7 12 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59.55 (3d ed. 2010) 
(emphasis added).8 In fact, by not objecting at any point in the proceedings, D.B, 
failed to create any record that he was actually surprised by either the State's resort 
to a theory of accomplice liability or the juvenile court's application of that theory. 
See438Main Street, 2004 UT 72,151 (stating that "[f] or a trial court to be afforded an 
opportunity to correct the error... the challenging party must introduce supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority"); State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845-46 (Utah 
1988) (noting inability to consider claim of error on the merits where defendant 
failed to create in trial court any supporting record). 
In sum, to preserve an issue for appeal the appellant must first present the 
issue to the trial court in a way that affords the trial court an opportunity to rule on 
that issue. Because D.B. failed to object when the juvenile court announced that its 
8
 The section from the Moore's Federal Practice relied on in Dugan, not 
readily available, is attached for the convenience of the Court at Addendum E, along 
with the current version of the treatise, as it discusses Fed. R. Civ. P. 46 and 59. 
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adjudication was based on accomplice liability, to preserve his issue for appeal D.B. 
was required to file an appropriate post-judgment motion. The court of appeals 
correctly recognized that in failing to take those steps, D.B. failed to preserve his 
claim for appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted February 7%, 2011. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRO^STCTN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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~' *" IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
^W& - RLED 
"
 o o 0 o
° UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
State of Utah in the 
interest of D.B., a person 
under eighteen years of age. 
D.B. , 
Petitioner, 
v. 
State of Utah, 
Respondent. 
SEP 2 7 2010 
Case No. 20100549-SC 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on July 6, 2010. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted as to the following issue. 
Whether a majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred 
in affirming the juvenile court's judgment. 
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. 
For The Court: 
Dated °\^i'iO 
^Mat thew B. Durrani 
Assoc ia te Chief J u s t i c e 
Addendum B 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. V I -Jury Trials 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of the United States 
"lAnnotated 
^Amendment VI. Jury Trial for Crimes, and Procedural Rights (Refs & 
Annos) 
••Amendment V I . Jury trials for crimes, and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-2-202 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
"•iChapter 2. Principles of Criminal Responsibility (Refs & Annos) 
"iPart 2. Criminal Responsibility for Conduct of Another (Refs & Annos) 
•*§ 76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense 
or for conduct of another 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-2-202. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-206 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
^iChapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
*aPart 2. Burglary and Criminal Trespass 
<+§ 76-6-206. Criminal trespass 
(1) As used in this section, "enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76- 6-
204 or a violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial obstruction: 
(a) the person enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any 
property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of 
another; 
(b) knowing the person's entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or 
remains on property as to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with 
apparent authority to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; 
or 
(c) the person enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-
7(7). 
(3)(a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is a class B misdemeanor 
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(c) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that: 
(a) the property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained; 
and 
(b) the actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's use of 
the property. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-206; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 15; Laws 1992, c. 14, § 
2: Laws 1996. c. 142, § 3, eff. April 29, 1996: Laws 2000. c. 132, § 4, eff. 
May 1, 2000: Laws 2001, c. 225, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001: Laws 2006, c. 210, 
5 1, eff. May 1, 2006: Laws 2010, c. 334, 5 9, eff. May 11, 2010. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-404 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
"iChapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
"iPart 4. Theft 
*§ 76-6-404. Theft-Elements 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-404. 
Utah R. Juv. P. Rule 44 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
*!Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
"iSection XII. Adjudication and Judgment 
-•RULE 44 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
(a) If, upon the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing, the court determines 
that the material allegations of the petition are established, it shall announce 
its ruling. The findings of fact upon which it bases its determination may also 
be announced or reserved for entry by the court in an order as provided in 
these Rules. In cases concerning any minor who has violated any federal, 
state, or local law or municipal ordinance, or any person under 21 years of 
age who has violated any such law or ordinance before becoming 18 years of 
age, findings of fact shall not be necessary. If, after such a determination, 
the dispositional hearing is not held immediately and the minor is in 
detention or shelter care, the court shall determine whether the minor shall 
be released or continued in detention, shelter care or the least restrictive 
alternative available. 
(b) In certification proceedings and permanent deprivation cases, the court 
shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law with specific reference to 
each statutory requirement considered, setting forth the complete basis for 
its determination. Such findings and conclusions may be prepared by counsel 
at the direction of the court, but shall be reviewed and modified as deemed 
appropriate by the court prior to the court's acceptance and signing of the 
documents submitted by counsel. 
(c) The court may at any time during or at the conclusion of any hearing, 
dismiss a petition and terminate the proceedings relating to the minor if 
such action is in the interest of justice and the welfare of the minor. The 
court shall dismiss any petition which has not been proven. 
(d) After the dispositional hearing, the court shall enter an appropriate order 
or decree of disposition. 
(e) Adjudication of a petition aiieging abuse, neglect, or dependency of a 
child shall be conducted also in accordance with Utah Code Section 78A-6-
309 and Section 78A-6-310. 
( f ) Adjudication of a petition to review the removal of a child from foster 
care shall be conducted also in accordance with Utah Code Section 78A-6-
318. 
[Effective January 1, 1995; amended effective November 1, 2004; April 1, 
2008; January 1, 2009.] 
Utah R. Juv. P. Rule 46 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
NlUtah Rules of Juvenile Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
"^Section XII. Adjudication and Judgment 
*RULE 46. DISPOSITION HEARING 
(a) Disposition hearings may be separate from the hearing at which the 
petition is proved or may follow immediately after that portion of the hearing 
at which the allegations of the petition are proved. Disposition hearings shall 
be conducted in an informal manner to facilitate the opportunity for all 
participants to be heard. 
(b) The court may receive any information that is relevant to the disposition 
of the case including reliable hearsay and opinions. Counsel for the parties 
are entitled to examine under oath the person who prepared the pre-
disposition report if such person is reasonably available. The parties are 
entitled to compulsory process for the appearance of any person, including 
character witnesses, to testify at the hearing. A minor's parent or guardian 
may address the court regarding the disposition of the case, and may 
address other issues with the permission of the court. 
(c) After the disposition hearing, the court shall enter an appropriate order. 
After announcing its order, the court shall advise any party who is present 
and not represented by counsel of the right to appeal the court's decision. 
(d) The disposition order made and entered by the court shall be reduced to 
writing and a copy mailed or furnished to the minor, and to the parent, 
guardian or custodian of a child, or counsel for the minor and parent, 
guardian or custodian, if any, the prosecuting attorney, the guardian ad 
litem, and any agency or person affected by the court's order. The 
disposition order may be prepared by counsel at the direction of the court, 
but shall be reviewed and modified as deemed appropriate by the court prior 
to the court's acceptance and signing of submission. 
(e) Disposition of a petition alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency of a 
child shall be conducted also in accordance with Utah Code Section 78A-6-
117, Section 78A-6-311. and Section 78A-6-312. 
[Effective January 1, 1995; amended effective April 1, 1996; April 1, 1997; 
May 10, 1999; November 1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2008; 
January, 2009.] 
Utah R. Juv. P. Rule 47 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
"iUtah Rules of Juvenile Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
"'iSection XII. Adjudication and Judgment 
*RULE 47. REVIEWS AND MODIFICATION OF ORDERS 
(a) Reviews. 
(a)(1) At the time of disposition in any case wherein a minor is placed on 
probation, under protective supervision or in the legal custody of an 
individual or agency, the court shall also order that the individual supervising 
the minor or the placement, submit a written report to the court at a future 
date and appear personally, if directed by the court, for the purpose of a 
court review of the case. If a date certain is not scheduled at the time of 
disposition, notice by mail of such review shall be given by the petitioner, if 
the review is a mandatory review, or by the party requesting the review to 
the supervising agency not less than 5 days prior to the review. Such notice 
shall also be given to the guardian ad litem, if one was appointed. 
(•at\(~)\ Mn mnrlifii-aHnn nf a nr\r\r rlicnnciHnnal nrrlor chall h<a marlo af a ronnri" 
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review that would have the effect of further restricting the rights of the 
parent, guardian, custodian or minor, unless the affected parent, guardian 
custodian or minor waives the right to a hearing and stipulates in open court 
or in writing to the modification. If a guardian ad litem is representing the 
minor, the court shall give a copy of the report to the guardian prior to the 
report review. 
(b) Review hearings. 
(b)(1) Any party in a case subject to review may request a review hearing. 
The request must be in writing and the request shall set forth the facts 
believed by the requesting party to warrant a review by the court. If the 
court determines that the alleged facts, if true, would justify a modification 
of the dispositional order, a review hearing shall be scheduled with notice, 
including a copy of the request, to all other parties. The court may schedule 
a review hearing on its own motion. 
(b)(2) The court may modify a prior dispositional order in a review hearing 
upon the stipulation of all parties and upon a finding by the court that such 
modification wouid not be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the 
public. 
(b)(3) The court shall not modify a prior order in a review hearing that would 
further restrict the rights of the parent, guardian, custodian or minor if the 
modification is objected to by any party prior to or in the review hearing. 
The court shall schedule the case for an evidentiary hearing and require that 
a motion for modification be filed with notice to all parties in accordance with 
Section 78A-6-1103. 
(b)(4) All cases which require periodic review hearings under Title 78A, 
Chapter 6 shall be scheduled for court review not less than once every six 
months from the date of disposition. 
(c) Disposition reviews. Upon the petition of any agency, individual or 
institution vested with legal custody or guardianship by prior court order, the 
court shall conduct a review hearing to determine if the prior order should 
remain in effect. Notice of the hearing, along with a copy of the petition, 
must be provided to all parties not less than 5 days prior to the hearing. 
(d) Review of a case involving abuse, neglect, or dependency of a minor 
shall be conducted also in accordance with Section 78A-6-117, Section 78A-
6-314, and Section 78A-6-315. 
(e) Intervention plans. 
(e)(1) In all cases where the disposition order places temporary iegai 
custody or guardianship of the minor with an individual, agency, or 
institution, a proposed intervention plan shall be submitted by the probation 
department when probation has been ordered; by the agency having 
custody or guardianship; or by the agency providing protective supervision, 
within 30 days following the date of disposition. This intervention plan shall 
be updated whenever a substantial change in conditions or circumstances 
arises. 
(e)(2) In cases where both parents have been permanently deprived of 
parental rights, the intervention plan shall identify efforts made by the child 
placing agency to secure the adoption of the minor and subsequent review 
hearings shall be heid until the minor has been adopted or permanently 
placed. 
(f) Progress reports. 
(f)(1) A written progress report relating to the intervention plan shall be 
submitted to the court and all parties by the agency, which prepared the 
intervention plan at least two working days prior to the review hearing date. 
(f)(2) The progress report shall contain the following: 
(f)(2)(i) A review of the original conditions, which invoked the court's 
jurisdiction. 
(f)(2)(ii) Any significant changes in these conditions. 
(f)(2)(iii) The number and types of contacts made with each family member 
or other person related to the case. 
(f)(2)(iv) A statement of progress toward resolving the problems identified 
in the intervention plan. 
(f)(2)(v) A report on the family's cooperation in resolving the problems. 
(f)(2)(vi) A recommendation for further order by the court. 
(g) In substantiation proceedings, a party may file a motion to set aside a 
default judgment or dismissal of a substantiation petition for failure to 
appear, within thirty days after the entry of the default judgment or 
dismissal. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party from a default judgment or dismissal if 
the court finds good cause for the party's failure to appear. The filing of a 
motion under this Subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. 
[Effective January 1, 1995; amended effective April 1, 1996; April 1, 1997; 
May 10, 1999; August 22, 2002; November 1, 2002; November 1, 2003; 
April 1, 2008; January 1, 2009.] 
Utah R. Juv. P. Rule 48 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
^lUtah Rules of Juvenile Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
"USection XII. Adjudication and Judgment 
<*RULE 48. NEW HEARINGS 
(a) New hearings shall be available in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 52, 59 
and 60. 
(b) If a new hearing is granted, the same burden of proof shall apply. 
[Effective January 1, 1995; amended effective November 1, 2002.] 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 46 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
"lUtah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
W a r t VI. Trials 
*RULE 46. EXCEPTIONS UNNECESSARY 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is 
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruiing or order of the court is made or 
sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to 
take or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; 
and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it 
is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
*llUtah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
llPart VII. Judgment 
•+RULE 59. NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENTS OF JUDGMENT 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61 , a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in 
an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has 
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the 
entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or 
any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding 
on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the 
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an 
additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply 
affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which 
it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend 
the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the 
judgment. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
"iUtah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*iPart VII. Judgment 
••RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is 
pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered 
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), 
or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall 
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 46 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts (Refs & 
Annos) 
W i d e VI. Trials 
-•Rule 46. Objecting to a Ruling or Order 
A formal exception to a ruling or order is unnecessary. When the ruling or 
order is requested or made, a party need only state the action that it wants 
the court to take or objects to, along with the grounds for the request or 
objection. Failing to object does not prejudice a party who had no 
opportunity to do so when the ruling or order was made. 
(Amended March 2, 1987, effective August 1, 1987; April 30, 2007, effective 
December 1, 2007.) 
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Before Judges Davis, Thorne, and Bench.1 
THORNE, Judge: 
fl- D.B. appeals from the juvenile court's adjudication finding 
him guilty as an accomplice, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-2 02 
(2008), on allegations of theft, see id. § 76-6-404, and criminal 
trespass, see id. § 76-6-206(2). We affirm. 
1. Judge Russell W. Bench participated in this case as a regular 
member of the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired from the court 
on January 1, 2010, before this decision issued. Hence, he is 
designated herein as a Senior Judge. See Utah Code Ann, 
103(2) (2008); Sup. Ct. R. of Prof•1 Practice 11-201(6), 
§ 78A-3' 
BACKGROUND 
%2 An eyewitness contacted police dispatch to report that two 
juvenile boys were attempting to break the padlocked gate to a 
construction site. Police responded and arrested D.B. and 
another juvenile. 
f3 The State filed a petition alleging twelve instances of 
criminal conduct including allegation four that D.B. had 
committed theft, see id. § 76-6-404, and allegation five that 
D.B. had committed criminal trespass, see id. § 76-6-206(2) . 
D.B. admitted to allegation one and the State dismissed 
allegations two and three. The juvenile court held a trial and 
heard evidence concerning allegations four and five, reserving 
the remaining counts for trial at a later date. At trial the 
eyewitness testified that uhe two boys were "hitting the fence 
padlock with either a rock or some type of bar" and "[b] oth tried 
to . . . climb the fence and they both jumped off and then one of 
the [d]efendants climbed into the fence and . . . [went] around 
to the back of the trailer."2 The eyewitness further testified 
2. The eyewitness, during his testimony, identified D.B. as 
being one of the involved individuals who had successfully 
climbed over the fence and went around to the back of the 
trailer. He testified during direct examination by the State as 
follows: 
Q. Okay. Is there any doubt in your mind of 
whether or not that's one of the boys? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you have the opportunity to see them 
closer on this occasion--on the event that it 
happened? 
A. On the event as it happened, I appeared--
the facial features from a distance. 
Q. Did the officers come and have you write 
a statement or anything of that nature? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did they have you identify the boys on 
that occasion? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. This individual is--you've 
identified in the courtroom, what was his 
participation? 
A. I think he was the one that was jumping 
into the trailer over the fence. 
During cross-examination, they eyewitness again identified D.B. 
as the individual who had climbed over the fence. He testified 
as follows: "Q. . . . And the boy that was--that jumped over 
(continued. . .) 
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that the other boy who was unable to climb the fence waited and 
acted ,? [a] s a watch-out." When asked what he meant by that and 
what did the boy do, the eyewitness stated that the other boy 
"[a]ppeared to be nervous, just looking around." The eyewitness 
also testified that he watched the boy that was inside of the 
fence the whole time until the police arrived.3 The codefendant, 
however, testified that both he and D.B. jumped the fence and 
both had the bolt cutters in their possession.4 When the police 
arrived they found D.B. outside the fenced area and the other 
boy, D.B.'s codefendant, inside the fenced area.5 After the 
2 . (...continued) 
the fence, you identified this individual right here sitting next 
to me at the table? A. Yes, sir. Q. As the one that jumped 
over the fence and was inside? A. Yes, sir." 
3. On cross-examination, the eyewitness specifically testified 
as follows: 
Q. Okay. What happened after you heard the 
clanking noise? 
A. The police—I was still on the phone with 
them to kind of hurry because I didn't know 
whether they were going to leave or what. 
And then immediately the police came down and 
I [saw] them pull them over and get the boy 
out of the fence . . . . 
Q. Okay. And the time that he jumped over 
the fence, and got inside the fence there, 
did you watch him the whole time? 
A. Yes, while I was on the phone with the 
police. 
Q. Okay. Until the police got there, you 
watched him the whole time? 
A. Yes. 
4. Ordinarily, I would not address the facts of the case, but in 
light of the dissent I point out that the juvenile court 
expressly found that the codefendant!s testimony, upon which the 
dissent relies as clearly supporting liability as a principal, 
see infra % 21, was not credible. 
5. After reviewing his report, one of che responding officers, 
Marco Mihailovich, testified that D.B.'s codefendant was inside 
the fenced-off area and D.B. was on the outside of the fence. 
Patrol Sergeant Steven Gowans, who arrived with officer 
Mihailovich and took D.B. into his custody, testified that D.B. 
was outside of the fence area: 
(continued...) 
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trial, the juvenile court announced that because the parties were 
returning to court on the remaining allegations related to the 
matter, it would give its trial verdict at that time. 
Thereafter, the juvenile court announced its adjudication finding 
D.B. guilty, as an accomplice, of theft and criminal trespass. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f4 D.B. argues that his guilt as an accomplice was neither 
alleged nor argued at trial and therefore the juvenile court's 
decision finding him guilty on the theory of accomplice liability 
was in violation of his due process rights. This issue presents 
a question of law that we review for correctness. See Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 25, 100 P.3d 1177 ("Constitutional issues, 
including questions regarding due process, are questions of law 
that we review for correctness."). When our review of such 
questions involves underlying factual issues, "we incorporate a 
clearly erroneous standard for the necessary subsidiary factual 
determinations." Id. 
ANALYSIS 
f5 D.B. asserts that the juvenile court's finding of accomplice 
liability was in violation of his due process rights because the 
State neither gave D.B. specific notice that it was pursuing an 
accomplice liability theory nor did the State actually request 
that the juvenile court utilize such a theory. The State 
initially responds that D.B. failed to preserve his due process 
challenge in the juvenile court. We first consider the threshold 
issue of whether D.B. preserved the issue for appellate review. 
f6 To preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must have been 
presented to the trial court in such a way that the court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue. See 43 8 Main St. v. Easy 
5. (...continued) 
Q. And what did you do--when you approached 
them, what did they do? 
A. One was still inside the fence. I took 
the other boy into custody, put handcuffs on 
him, and secured m m m my car, uhen wenu 
back to — Officer Mihailovich was still 
standing by the fence with the other boy 
still trying to get back over. 
Q. What was the name of the boy that you 
took into your custody, do you recall? 
A. [D.B.] 
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Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, % 51, 99 P.3d 801. "This preservation 
rule has been extended to apply to every claim unless a [party] 
can demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist or plain 
error occurred." Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, f 23, 186 P. 3d 
978 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) . 
Issues that are not raised at trial are generally deemed to be 
waived. See 43 8 Main St., 2 004 UT 72, 1 51. The presence of a 
constitutional issue does not excuse an appellant from complying 
with the preservation rules set by the supreme court and the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See O'Dea v. Plea, 2 0 09 UT 46, 
1 18, 217 P.3d 704. 
%1 Rather than arguing that D.B. properly preserved the issue 
for appeal or advancing grounds upon which we may review an 
unpreserved issue,6 D.B. argues that preservation is irrelevant. 
In particular, D.B. argues that he was not obligated to raise his 
objection at trial since there was nothing to object to during 
the trial because the State gave no indication that it was 
pursuing a theory of accomplice liability. 
f8 I disagree that D.B. was not given notice that such a theory 
was being pursued. Without determining the type of notice the 
prosecution must give at trial, I note that accomplice liability 
is not a separate offense from principal liability, see State v. 
Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, ] 12, 56 P.3d 969, and n[i]t is well 
settled that accomplices incur the same liability as principals," 
id. Moreover, "a person charged with a crime has adequate notice 
of the possibility of accomplice liability being raised at trial 
because conviction of accomplice and principal liability do not 
require proof of different elements or proof of different 
quality."7 Id. As such, it may reasonably be presumed that D.B. 
6. Although D.B. asserts in his opening brief that the juvenile 
court erred by finding accomplice liability without any motion or 
request by the State, he raised the plain error argument only in 
his reply brief. We decline to review the issue of plain error 
when raised for the first time in an appellant's reply brief. 
See Berkshires, LLC v. Svkes, 2005 UT App 536, f 20, 127 P.3d 
1243. 
7. I disagree with the dissent that Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 
110 (1991), a death penalty case, is an instructive case for the 
issue on appeal. First, death penalty cases present a special 
situation which the Lankford Court recognized requires extra care 
and notice. See id. at 126 n.22 ("In the capital context, in 
which the threatened loss is so severe, the need for notice is 
even more pronounced."). Second, the Court's determination that 
the defendant did not receive adequate notice was largely based 
(continued...) 
20080837-CA 5 
was aware that even if he successfully defended against principal 
liability that should the evidence demonstrate that he solicited, 
requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided another 
person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense he could 
be found responsible as an accomplice. Cf. State v. White, 577 
P.2d 552, 554 (Utah 1978) (finding an evidentiary basis upon 
which to instruct on either principal or accomplice liability and 
rejecting the defendant's argument that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury on aiding and abetting when the defendant 
was charged and tried as the principal in the crime and not as 
one who aided someone else in its commission). 
f9 After the presentation of testimony, which included 
testimony that would support both principal and accomplice 
7. (...continued) 
on the circumstances of the case. See id. at 111 ("The unique 
circumstances that gives rise to concern about the adequacy of 
the notice in this case is the fact that, pursuant to court 
order, the prosecutor had formally advised the trial judge and 
petitioner that the [s]tate would not recommend the death 
penalty."). In Lankford, the Court determined that it was 
unrealistic to assume that the notice provided by the statute and 
the arraignment survived the state's response to a presentencing 
order where the state specifically said that it would not pursue 
the death penalty, and the trial court's silence following that 
response. See id. at 12 0 ("The presentencing order entered by 
the trial court requiring the [s]tate to advise the court and the 
defendant whether it sought the death penalty, and if so, 
requiring the parties to specify the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances on which they intended to rely, was comparable to a 
pretrial order limiting the issues to be tried. The purpose of 
such orders is to eliminate the need to address matters that are 
not in dispute, and thereby to save the valuable time of judges 
and lawyers.11). The Court found that the trial court's silence 
had the practical effect of concealing from the parties the 
principal issue to be decided at the sentencing hearing, that is, 
whether to impose the death penalty. See id. ("There is nothing 
in the record after the [s]tate's response to the presentencing 
order and before the trial judge's remark at the end of the 
hearing that mentioned the possibility of a capital sentence. 
During the hearing, while both defense counsel and the prosecutor 
were arguing tne merits of concurrent ox consecutive, and fixed 
or indeterminate, terms, the silent judge was the only person in 
the courtroom who knew that the real issue that they should have 
been debating was the choice between life or death."). Such is 
not the situation here, neither the State nor the juvenile court 
made any affirmative representation or other indication that 
accomplice liability was not a possibility. 
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liability theories, D.B. had several opportunities to challenge 
the application of accomplice liability. The first opportunity 
arose when the State, during its closing argument in rebuttal, 
argued accomplice liability stating, 
I didn't mean to misinform, if I stated that 
both climbed the fence. . . . But the 
problem [the defense] has with this whole 
case is: No matter where [D.B.] was, it was 
clear, [the eyewitness] says he was a 
lookout. . . . [The eyewitness] thought he 
was a lookout, he was watching things, and so 
he's just as responsible for what his Co-
defendant does as if he committed that crime. 
This comment was a clear statement that the State was not 
foregoing an accomplice liability theory. Moreover, the State, 
after hearing D.B.'s closing argument, which largely focused on 
principal liability,8 clarified that the State was indeed 
pursuing an accomplice liability theory by asserting that D.B. 
was liable for criminal trespass and theft since D.B. 
intentionally aided his codefendant by acting as a lookout. As 
such, D.B. had additional notice that the State was pursuing an 
accomplice liability theory and, at that point before 
disposition, had an opportunity to object and request a 
continuance if he needed more time to tailor a defense due to an 
unfair surprise assertion of accomplice liability. 
KlO The next opportunity D.B. had to raise his due process claim 
occurred when the juvenile court announced in open court, 
approximately three weeks after trial, D.B.'s guilt on the theory 
of accomplice liability.9 There was nothing to prevent D.B. from 
alerting the juvenile court at the time of disposition or 
thereafter in a postjudgment motion, see Utah R. Juv. P. 44, 
8. Regarding the criminal trespass charge, D.B. argued that 
"[t]he fact is, he never did go into the construction yard, and, 
consequently, there was no criminal trespass on his behalf." 
Respecting the theft charge, D.B. argued " [t]he fact of the 
matter is that there just isn't any evidence that [D.B.] entered 
into the construction yard and had possession of any bolt cutters 
or anything else that would indicate he was--that he, in fact, 
,-, ,-v ,-y-,-T-y-, - I f - - 1 - / - , - 3 - -1-"1 •C"1- » 
9. The juvenile court in announcing its decision explicitly 
discussed accomplice liability and specifically referenced Utah 
Code section 76-2-202 entitled, "Criminal responsibility for 
direct commission of offense or for conduct of another," see Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (2008). 
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47, 48(a),10 that the State had failed to argue accomplice 
liability and arguing that D.B. had not been given an opportunity 
to present a defense to this alternate theory. Although a 
postjudgment motion on an issue is not necessary if D.B. had 
otherwise raised the issue, a timely postjudgment motion may in 
some instances be used to preserve an issue not previously raised 
if the court considers and rules on the issues raised in a 
postjudgment motion. Cf. Normandeau v. Hanson Equip., Inc., 2 009 
UT 44, % 23, 215 P.3d 152 ("f [0]nce trial counsel has raised an 
issue before the trial court, and the trial court has considered 
the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal.f" (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Belaard, 
830 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1992) (holding that issues raised and 
dealt with in posttrial evidentiary hearings are preserved for 
appeal). 
fll D.B.'s failure to object either at trial, at the time of 
adjudication, or through a postjudgment motion deprived the 
juvenile court of its opportunity to address the claimed error 
and, if merited, correct it. See Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, 
K 24, 186 P.3d 978. Accordingly, we conclude that D.B. failed to 
preserve his due process claim and we affirm the juvenile court's 
determination. 
CONCLUSION 
Hl2 D.B. was on notice that when charged with a criminal 
violation he could be convicted as either a principal or as an 
accomplice at trial. The State did not affirmatively exclude 
application of accomplice liability. D.B. had several 
opportunities to assert that application of such a theory was 
done in violation of his due process. D.B. failed to object to 
this theory during the State's presentation of the evidence that 
would support D.B.'s guilt under an accomplice liability theory. 
Likewise, D.B. failed to raise the issue either at the 
adjudication hearing wherein the juvenile court explicitly 
10. Although a party is not required to file a postjudgment 
motion before the trial court as a prerequisite to filing an 
appeal, see Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, %% 15-16, 2 P.3d 
442, nor does reference to the issue in such a filing necessarily 
preserve the point; for appeal, see LeBaron & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 484 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
raising the issue after disposition would have afforded the 
juvenile court an opportunity to address the issue. Cf. State v. 
Belaard, 830 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1992) (holding that issues 
raised and dealt with in posttrial evidentiary hearings may be 
preserved for appeal). 
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applied the theory of accomplice liability or thereafter through 
a postjudgment motion. D.B.'s failure to raise the issue 
deprived the juvenile court of its opportunity to address the 
claimed error and, if merited, correct it. Thus, we conclude 
that D.B. failed to preserve his due process claim and we affirm 
the juvenile court's determination.11 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
BENCH, Senior Judge (concurring in the result): 
1|l3 I am willing to assume that, before the juvenile court 
entered its ruling, D.B. did not have fair notice that the State 
was relying on a theory of accomplice liability. But once the 
juvenile court ruled, D.B. certainly knew that accomplice 
liability was the basis for the court's decision. Although D.B. 
could easily have raised the issue in a postjudgment motion, he 
did absolutely nothing to bring his objection to the attention of 
the juvenile court. Instead, D.B. attempts to raise this issue 
for the first time on appeal. Because this issue was not 
preserved below, we should not address it. 
I^14 Issues "not raised before the trial court may not be raised 
[for the first time] on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
i 11, 10 P.3d 346. 
[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [,] 
the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has 
an opportunity to rule on that issue. This 
requirement puts the trial judge on notice of 
11. I agree with the concurring opinion that D.B. did not 
preserve his argument that he lacked notice of accomplice 
liability and that if D.B. did in fact lack notice it was 
necessary for him to raise the issue in a postjudgment motion. 
To the extent that this opinion touches on the merits of the 
case, it is solely in response to D.B.'s argument that 
preservation is irrelevant and that there was nothing to object 
to in order to preserve the issue of accomplice liability notice. 
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the asserted error and allows for correction 
at that time in the course of the proceeding. 
For a trial court to be afforded an 
opportunity to correct the error (1) the 
issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] 
(2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] 
and (3) the challenging party must introduce 
supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority. 
438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, K 51, 99 P.3d 801 
(alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). This court will not address an unpreserved issue 
absent either plain error or exceptional circumstances, see 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, neither of which exceptions D.B. 
properly raises on appeal. See supra ^ 7 n.6. 
fl5 The dissent claims that D.B. should not be penalized for his 
failure to raise the issue below because a postjudgment motion is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to preserve this issue for 
appeal. It was entirely possible and appropriate for D.B. to 
raise the issue of notice of the accomplice liability theory in a 
postjudgment motion. Rule 48 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile 
Procedure states that "[n]ew hearings shall be available in 
accordance with [rules] 52, 59, and 60 [of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure]." Utah R. Juv. P. 48(a). Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to receive a new trial if 
there is, among other grounds, "[an i]rregularity in the 
proceedings of the court . . . or abuse of discretion by which 
either party was prevented from having a fair trial." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 59(a) (1). Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows a party relief from a judgment on, among other 
grounds, surprise or "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." Id. R. 60(b).1 Thus, a postjudgment 
motion would have been sufficient to preserve the issue and was 
also necessary. See generally In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, f 61, 201 
P.3d 985 (stating that although "superfluous to demand that a 
party challenge the evidentiary support for a court's findings 
shortly after the court articulates them," it is "wholly 
necessary for a party to challenge and thus afford the trial 
court an opportunity to correct [an] alleged error" (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); 438 Main St., 2004 UT 72, ^ 55-56 
(concluding that a plaintiff could have raised the issue of the 
sufficiency of de"cail of a trial court! s factual findings m a 
1. The State also identifies three other rules that could have 
formed a basis for requesting postjudgment relief: rule 44(c), 
rule 46(a), and rule 47(b) (l)-(2) of the Utah Rules of Juvenile 
Procedure. 
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postjudgment motion for a new trial but failed to do so and 
thereby failed to preserve the issue for appeal); Holgate, 2000 
UT 74, UK 14-16 (concluding that "a [criminal] defendant must 
raise [an objection to] the sufficiency of the evidence by proper 
motion or objection [, including by postjudgment motion,] to 
preserve the issue for appeal" so that "the issue will be brought 
to the trial court's attention and the trial court will have the 
opportunity to address the issue").2 
1fl6 The cases cited by the dissent do not stand for the 
proposition that a postjudgment motion is unnecessary or 
insufficient to preserve issues for appeal. In Sittner v. 
Schriever, 2000 UT 45, 2 P.3d 442, the supreme court noted that 
the preservation rule does not "require a party to file a post-
judgment motion before the trial court as a prerequisite to 
filing an appeal." Id. K IS. The court concluded, however, that 
the party there had already preserved the issues he appealed: 
two issues were briefed in motions and other pleadings, and the 
other issue was one of appellate procedure over which the trial 
court "lacked authority and jurisdiction." Id. % 17. Thus, 
Sittner merely stands for the proposition that, while a party 
must raise an issue before the trial court to preserve it, a 
party is not required to raise it a second time in a postjudgment 
motion. In the other case cited by the dissent, State v. 
Erickson, 722 P.2d 756 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), the supreme 
court held that a defendant failed to preserve for appeal an 
evidence suppression issue. See id. at 759. The defendant there 
failed to timely raise the issue in a motion to suppress or at 
trial and instead attempted to raise the evidentiary issue 
improperly in a postjudgment motion. See id. 
1Jl7 In my opinion, if D.B. lacked notice of the accomplice 
liability theory at trial, it was necessary for him to raise the 
issue in a postjudgment motion. And absent a postjudgment motion 
requesting that the trial court determine whether D.B. had 
2. I recognize that under rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a party may appeal the sufficiency of the evidence 
from a bench crial without first raising the issue before the 
trial court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b) ("When findings of fact 
are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party 
raising the question has made in the district court an objection 
to such findings."). That is not the claim asserted here. 
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adequate notice of the accomplice liability theory, this issue 
was not preserved for appeal. 
fl8 I therefore concur in affirming the judgment. 
Russell W. Bench, Senior Judge 
DAVIS, Presiding Judge (dissenting): 
fl9 First, I write separately to correct the lead opinion's 
misleading characterization of the evidence and argument 
presented at trial. Second, I write to respond to the lead 
opinion's erroneous statements regarding the level of notice that 
the prosecution must provide at trial regarding the theory of 
guilt it is pursuing. Third, I dissent from the lead opinion's 
reasoning that "D.B. had several opportunities to challenge the 
application of accomplice liability," see supra \ 9, and the lead 
opinion's conclusion that under the circumstances an objection 
was required to permit appellate review. 
I. The Presentation of Evidence and Argument at Trial 
f20 The lead opinion incorrectly represents that the evidence 
produced by the State clearly supported that D.B. was acting as 
an accomplice. The evidence does so only when it is rearranged 
and edited in a way that is not consistent with the way in which 
is was presented at trial. The lead opinion sets forth only the 
evidence that, when combined together1 and considered in 
isolation from the remainder of the evidence and argument 
presented at' trial, could have supported the trial court's 
conclusion as to accomplice liability.2 But the question here is 
1. The State did not draw a connection between these pieces of 
evidence in its argument before the trial court, let alone argue 
accomplice liability based on such a connection. 
2. For example, the lead opinion concedes in a footnote that 
the eyewitness unequivocally identified D.B. as the boy who 
crossed the fence, evidence which clearly supports a principal 
liability theory of guilt. See supra \ 3 n.2. Yet the lead 
opinion does not include this fact when relating the testimony 
at trial, leaving the testimony simply that one boy entered 
the construction site and one boy acted as a lookout. See 
supra,f 3. When the testimony is edited in this way, 
(continued. . .) 
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whether the evidence and argument at trial, taken as a whole, 
gave D.B. notice that the State was pursuing a conviction under 
an accomplice liability theory. Cf. State v. Wilcox, 808 P. 2d 
1028, 1032 n.l (Utah 1991) (If[T]he constitutional adequacy of the 
evidence in this case is not the issue before this court today; 
rather, it is whether [the defendant] is sufficiently apprised of 
the evidence supporting the case against him to prepare a defense 
against that case. We should not distort the constitutional 
notice analysis by importing considerations that may be 
appropriate under other constitutional provisions."). Thus, we 
are obligated to consider the evidence as presented at trial in 
our consideration of the issue raised on appeal. 
f21 The evidence and argument, as it was presented at trial, 
simply did not signal that the State was pursuing an accomplice 
liability theory of guilt. Directly following the eyewitness's 
testimony that D.B. was the boy who crossed the fence, the State 
called D.B.'s codefendant to the stand. The codefendant 
testified that both he and D.B. had jumped over the fence and 
that they had acted together in stealing the bolt cutters--D.B. 
being the one who first took possession of the bolt cutters and 
wanted to take them. The codefendant also testified that only 
D.B. had jumped back out of the fenced area before the police 
arrived.3 This account was consistent with the police officers1 
testimony, which was the next testimony the State chose to 
present, that when they arrived at the scene, D.B. was outside 
the fenced area while his codefendant was inside. Thus, the 
testimony of the eyewitness and the codefendant--both indicating 
that D.B. had actually entered into the fenced area--clearly 
supported liability as a principal, and the presentation of this 
2. (...continued) 
silent as to which role D.B. played, it then may suggest an 
accomplice liability theory of guilt. 
3. The lead opinion notes that the trial court found the 
codefendant's testimony to be not credible. See supra f 3 n.4. 
I simply do not see the impact of such an observation. First, 
the prosecution, not D.3., relied on the testimony found to be 
not credible. Second, the eyewitness's testimony, which the 
court did find to be credible, also directly supported a 
principal liability theory because the eyewitness said D.B. was 
the boy who crossed the fence and not the boy who acted as a 
lookout. Third, and most importantly, the trial court's ultimate 
determination days later as to credibility speaks nothing to the 
issue here--whether D.B. was put on notice by the evidence and 
argument at trial that the State was pursuing an accomplice 
liability theory of guilt. 
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testimony in no way indicated that the State intended to argue 
liability as an accomplice. 
[^22 Indeed, of all the evidence produced and statements uttered 
at trial, the only one that can be construed to be arguing 
accomplice liability--and then only when generously construed in 
a light favorable to the State--is one statement by the 
prosecutor in his rebuttal closing argument. But contrary to the 
representation made by the lead opinion, the rebuttal closing 
argument did not "clarifFvl that the State was indeed pursuing an 
accomplice liability theory," see supra f 9 (emphasis added). 
Instead, the rebuttal closing argument was a change from what the 
prosecutor had argued minutes before in his original closing 
argument, which had clearly set forth the theory that D.B. was 
guilty as a principal: 
[The eyewitness] observed both of them to 
eventually climb and jump into the area. He 
said they got in and went around, they 
appeared to be nervous. He was concerned 
enough that he contacted the local police 
department. 
. . . [The codefendant] testified that 
they went into the fenced area, him and 
[D.B.] both. [D.B.] grabbed the bolt 
cutters, tossed them to him, and told him to 
throw them over the fence. . . . 
The bottom line is, [the codefendant] 
indicated that they both crossed the fence, 
that fenced area that's padlocked, which 
would cover the trespass. And then an item 
that they located in that area was thrown 
over the fence, which shows an intent to 
steal something, which should cover the theft 
as well . . . . Therefore [D.B.] should be 
found guilty of both charges. 
Defense counsel then responded, pointing out the State's 
misstatement of the eyewitness's testimony and arguing that D.B. 
committed neither trespass nor theft: 
iHtt JLCLL-L i»3; iu.ID . j never ciiu yu xu^u uu6 
construction yard, and, consequently, there 
was no criminal trespass on his behalf. 
. . . The fact of the matter is that 
there just isn't any evidence that [D.3.] 
entered into the construction yard and had 
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possession of any bolt cutters or anything 
else that would indicate he was--that he, in 
fact, committed a theft. 
After this, the prosecutor corrected himself, made a new 
misstatement of the eyewitness1s testimony, and then made the 
State's first allusion whatsoever to accomplice liability: 
I didn't mean to misinform, if I stated that 
both climbed the fence. . . . But the 
problem [the defense] has with this whole 
case is: No matter where [D.B.] was, it was 
clear, [the eyewitness] says he was a 
lookout. . . . He thought he was a lookout, 
he was watching things, and so he's just as 
responsible for what his [codefendant] does 
as if he committed that crime. And he should 
be found guilty, Your Honor. 
Thus, this statement from the rebuttal closing argument was far 
from clarifying something that the State had argued all along but 
was, instead, the first mention at trial even mildly suggestive 
of accomplice liability. 
II. The Issue on Appeal and the Corresponding Law 
f23 Interestingly, although the lead opinion says that it does 
not ndetermin[e] the type of notice the prosecution must give at 
trial," supra f 8, it essentially goes on to conclude that no 
notice is necessary so long as the defendant is "charged with a 
criminal violation"; "[t]he State [does] not affirmatively 
exclude application of accomplice liability"; and there exists 
"evidence that would support . . . guilt under an accomplice 
liability theory," regardless of whether such evidence was 
actually used in that manner, supra % 12 (emphasis added). And 
although the lead opinion reframes the issue as one of 
preservation, the two are essentially the same issue--whether 
D.B. was given adequate notice (either notice to object or to 
prepare a defense). I think that in such a situation, where we 
essentially reach the issue on appeal in our determination of the 
"threshold issue" of preservation, reliance on the preservation 
rule to affirm the lower court is less than helpful. 
TJ24 As to the analysis of the notice requirement, the lead 
opinion misconstrues the relevant case law. The parties agree 
regarding the liability of accomplices and that, as the lead 
opinion quotes, "a person charged with a crime has adequate 
notice of the possibility of accomplice liability beincr raised at 
trial because conviction of accomplice and principal liability do. 
not require proof of different elements or proof of different 
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quality,« State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, % 12, 56 P.3d 969 
(emphases added). But this is entirely unhelpful in shedding 
light on the question of what constitutes constitutionally 
sufficient notice that accomplice liability is being raised at 
trial. See generally U.S. Const, amend. VI ("In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . .") .4 
f25 Further, as I referenced above, see supra *§ 20, the lead 
opinion mistakenly places emphasis on the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the trial court's determination. The lead 
opinion argues that so long as the evidence is sufficient to 
support an accomplice liability theory, the defendant must defend 
against it, regardless of whether such a theory was argued by the 
prosecution at trial. See supra f 8. But I do not agree that 
the mere existence of facts that could have been used to support 
a certain theory is relevant if the theory is never actually 
raised at trial. And the only authority the lead opinion cites 
for such a proposition is a case in which there was sufficient 
evidence to support a jury instruction on accomplice liability, 
which instruction would have clearly put the defendant on notice 
at trial that such a theory was being considered, see State v. 
White, 577 P.2d 552, 554 (Utah 1978). Certainly had the 
accomplice liability theory been advanced at trial, I 
wholeheartedly agree that there would have been sufficient 
evidence to support the theory. But this is precisely the 
point--the theory was not advanced at trial and therefore the 
defense could not be expected to challenge such a theory. Cf. 
Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 120 (1991) (recognizing that 
although there were no limits placed on the defense counsel's 
preparation, "it was surely reasonable for the defense to assume 
that there was no reason to present argument or evidence directed 
4. Clearly the minimum notice requirements for the information 
are not the same as those for trial. See generally State v. 
Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, M 9-10, 56 P.3d 969 ("We find it 
unreasonable to require the State to give notice, at a stage as 
early as the filing of an information, of all possible theories 
that might arise, including those that do not become part of the 
State's case. . . . Our supreme court has stated that an 
information is 'legally sufficient even if it consists of nothing 
more than an extremely summary statement of the charge.1" 
(emphasis added)). Indeed, it defies logic to imply tnat the 
State need not disclose its exact theory at trial. Such would 
mean that the State never has to disclose a theory of its case 
and the defense always has to prepare and defend against every 
possible theory, even those that are unannounced. This surely 
violates any notion of procedural fairness or constitutional due 
process rights. 
20080837-CA 16 
at whether the death penalty was either appropriate or 
permissible" where the prosecution never argued for the 
application of the death penalty). 
[^26 Instead, an instructive case for the issue on appeal is 
Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991). In Lankford, after the 
defendant had been found guilty, the State did not argue in the 
sentencing phase for the imposition of the death penalty but 
instead asked for an indeterminate life sentence. See id. at 
116. In response, although the evidence could have supported a 
death penalty sentence, the defense understandably made no 
argument against the imposition of the death penalty but instead 
focused its argument on urging a shorter sentence than the 
sentence recommended by the State. See id. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the trial court made a statement that included a 
brief and somewhat unclear mention of the death penalty. See id. 
at 116-17. 
At the beginning of this lengthy statement, 
[the trial court] described the options 
available to the court, including the 
indeterminate life sentence recommended by 
the State, "or a fixed life sentence for a 
period of time greater than the number of 
years he would serve on a indeterminate life 
sentence, i.e., ten. For example, a fixed 
term of 40 years or death or a fixed life 
sentence." 
Id. Apparently, no objection was made by the defense to the 
passing reference to the death penalty. A few days later, the 
trial court sentenced the defendant to death. See id. at 117. 
The defendant petitioned for postconviction relief, which the 
trial court denied/ and the denial was subsequently affirmed by 
the Idaho Supreme Court. See id. at 118. The United States 
Supreme Court, however, reversed. See id. at 128. Although 
acknowledging that "the trial judge's power to impose a sentence 
that is authorized by statute is not limited by a prosecutor's 
recommendation," the Court clarified that !l[t]he issue is one of 
adequate procedure rather than substantive power." Id. at 119. 
"The question . . . is whether it can be said that counsel had 
adequate notice of the critical issue that the judge was actually 
debating. Our answer to that question must reflect the 
importance that we attach to the concept of fair notice as the 
bedrock of any constitutionally fair procedure." Id. at 12 0-21. 
"If notice is not given, and the adversary process is not 
permitted to function properly, there is an increased chance of 
error, and with that, the possibility of an incorrect result." 
Id. at 127 (citation omitted). Notwithstanding the one brief 
reference to the death penalty at the close of the sentencing 
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hearing, the Court ultimately determined that the defendant had a 
"lack of adequate notice" that the death penalty was at issue and 
that this "created an impermissible risk that the adversary 
process may have malfunctioned in this case." Id. 
f27 The case before us is similar to Lankford. Although the 
trial here ended with one brief comment by the prosecutor that 
could have been interpreted as suggesting a theory of accomplice 
liability, such a theory was not argued or advanced prior to the 
parting comment. Instead, the State had clearly pursued another 
theory of liability in its argument at trial. Thus, the defense 
did not receive adequate notice of the ultimate issue upon which 
the case would be decided. I do not think, nor apparently did 
the Lankford Court, that one vague allusion to an issue at the 
close of the presentation of evidence and argument qualifies as 
constitutionally adequate notice.5 Indeed, the several cases 
cited by the parties on appeal support the proposition that 
notice of an accomplice liability theory must be given at trial-
contrary to what the lead opinion concludes--and that notice must 
be given in a more direct fashion than in one parting comment 
after the defense has finished arguing its case. See Calderon v. 
5. Although admittedly there are differences between the case at 
hand and the situation in Lankford, I do not see that such 
differences make the law and reasoning set forth in Lankford 
inapplicable to the instant case. First, there is no indication 
whatsoever in Lankford that notice is required only in capital 
cases. Rather, the Court explained, 
In a variety of contexts, our cases have 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
giving the parties sufficient notice to 
enable them to identify the issues on which a 
decision may turn. In the capital context, 
in which the threatened loss is so severe, 
the need for notice is even more pronounced. 
Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 126 n.22 (1991) (emphases added) 
(citations omitted). Second, I fail to see the practical 
difference between the prosecution stating that it will not 
pursue a theory and the prosecution simply opting to forgo that 
theory without comment. Either way, the defendant has no notice 
that the issue is being considered. And regardless, "while both 
defense counsel and the prosecutor were arguing the merits of 
[principal liability], the silent judge was the only person in 
the courtroom who knew that the real issue that they should have 
been debating was [whether D.B. was guilty as an accomplice] ." 
See id. at 120. A defendant simply should not be convicted on a 
theory that is left unargued by the prosecution, regardless of 
whether forgoing such theory was a conscious, articulated 
decision on the part of the State. 
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Pruntv, 59 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 1995) (determining that 
adequate notice was given at trial because the prosecutor's 
opening argument essentially set forth the contested theory); 
State v. Mancine, 590 A.2d 1107, 1121 (N.J. 1991) (stressing that 
the defense was aware of the accomplice liability theory, 
stating, "In fact, in his closing argument, defense counsel 
emphasized that the State had two 'alternative' theories in an 
attempt to raise reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors."); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 482 A.2d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) 
(noting that "[the defendant's] criminal liability as an 
accomplice was advanced repeatedly during the trial in which he 
attempted to transfer criminal responsibility to [his 
codefendant] ") ; State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, 1f 9, 56 P.3d 
969 (explaining that the State did not change its position but, 
rather, the defendant "was tried and convicted as a principal"). 
III. The Failure to Object Below 
A. The Rebuttal Closing Argument 
f28 It may be true that the statement from the prosecutor's 
rebuttal closing argument could have brought to mind the idea of 
accomplice liability. But I do not believe that after a trial 
full of evidence directly supporting principal liability and the 
prosecutor arguing principal liability in his original closing 
argument, this one statement in the final minutes of trial, which 
statement did not even specifically mention accomplice liability, 
was sufficient to put the defense on notice that the State was 
pursuing an accomplice liability theory.6 As just discussed 
above, such a parting reference is not sufficient to provide 
constitutionally adequate notice to a defendant. I therefore do 
not agree that we should fault a defendant for failing to object 
to such a reference. 
%29 Furthermore, even assuming that the statement made in the 
State's rebuttal closing argument caused D.B.'s counsel to begin 
questioning whether accomplice liability was now being suggested, 
he could not reasonably have been expected to object and provide 
the State with another theory of liability in time for the State 
to amend its argument and specifically argue the theory. And it 
certainly is not the responsibility of the defense to assure that 
6. And I can think of no situation, either at the trial level or 
on appeal, where a party is allowed to raise a brand new issue or 
theory in rebuttal. See generally U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen. , 
Inc., 1999 UT App 303, \ 63, 990 P.2d 945 ("To allow a party to 
raise new issues in its rebuttal materials is improper because it 
precludes the other party the opportunity to respond."). 
20080837-CA 19 
the State takes the necessary steps to present its case so as to 
properly convict the defendant. 
f30 Moreover--and most importantly--D.B.'s argument on appeal is 
not that the statement made during the rebuttal closing argument 
was somehow inappropriate, i.e., some sort of prosecutorial 
misconduct. Instead, his argument is that the trial court 
violated D.B.'s due process rights by basing its finding of guilt 
on an accomplice liability theory that was not pursued or argued 
in any fashion that would allow D.B. to prepare a defense at 
trial. Thus, the error that D.B. challenges occurred when the 
trial court made its decision three weeks after the trial. I 
therefore think it is totally unreasonable to fault D.B. for not 
raising the issue at trial--before the error complained of 
actually even occurred. The statement in the rebuttal closing 
argument simply does not qualify as one of D.B.'s "several 
opportunities to challenge the application of accomplice 
liability," see supra % 9, when the statement was made weeks 
before the application of the theory. 
B. The Announcement of the Trial Court's Final Decision 
1|31 When the trial court announced its decision three weeks 
after trial, it was clear that the trial court was not convinced 
that D.B. acted as a principal in the theft or trespass: 
I find that [the eyewitness's] testimony was 
credible. [The codefendant] testified that 
both he and [D.B.] jumped the fence, and both 
had . . . the bolt cutters in their 
possession. I don't find that was credible, 
not only based on the fact that [the 
eyewitness] only saw one individual climb the 
fence. And when the police arrived, there 
was one individual inside the fence [(the 
codefendant)] and one individual outside the 
fence [(D.B.)]. And so, I just didn't find 
that [the codefendant] was credible, and that 
both boys jumped the fence. 
Instead, the trial court determined that D.B. was guilty as an 
accomplice. This occasion was what the lead opinion considers 
the second of D.B.'s "several opportunities" to object. 
f32 I do not agree that in order to preserve the issue for 
appeal D.B. was required to object to an error made in the trial 
court's final ruling, which was handed down several weeks after 
trial had concluded. The lead opinion relies on 438 Main St. v. 
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 99 P.3d 801, for the proposition 
that such an objection is mandatory. See supra % 6. However, 
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that case ultimately cites to Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 
P.2d 844 (Utah 1998), as authority for the proposition, see 438 
Main St., 2004 UT 72, f 51, and Badger clarifies the rule: "In a 
trial setting, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party 
must first raise the issue in the trial court. . . . Issues not 
raised at trial are usually deemed waived," 966 P.2d at 847 
(emphases added). 
f33 Such a distinction--between whether the error actually 
occurred at trial or whether it occurred in the trial court' s 
decision after trial — is in harmony with the policies behind the 
preservation rule. One purpose of the preservation rule "is to 
put[] the judge on notice of the asserted error and allow[] the 
opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the 
proceeding." Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) / see also Tschaageny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2 0 07 UT 
37, f 20, 163 P.3d 615. Here, any objection raised as the trial 
court delivered its decision would not have allowed "for 
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding," see 
Badger, 966 P.2d at 847 (internal quotation marks omitted), 
because the proceedings were already completed. In fact, 
considering the trial court's specific finding that D.B. was not 
guilty as a principal, had the court recognized its mistake at 
this juncture, the only remaining option would have been to 
simply change the ultimate conclusion and acquit D.B.7 Thus, no 
sort of judicial economy would have been served by objecting at 
this point. Further, the trial court did not need D.B. to put it 
on notice of the error--that the trial court was finding 
liability on an argument not advanced by the State. Indeed, it 
was the trial court that had raised the issue to the parties' 
attention, considered relevant case law, and made a decision 
respecting the issue: 
Now, I have also looked at the case of 
[State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, 56 P.3d 
969,] uhat: indicates that: "Accomplice 
liability is not a separate offense from 
principal liability, so it does not require 
specific notice or indictment or information 
because it is well-settled that accomplice[s] 
incur the same liability as principals." [6] 
7. Hence, any error by the nrial couri: in applying an accomplice 
liability theory was clearly prejudicial to D.B. 
8. Contrary to how it appears in the transcript, this language 
is not a direct quote from State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, 56 
P.3d 969. Indeed, this interpretation by the trial court goes 
(continued. . .) 
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Thus, the trial court, which was well aware that the defense had 
never been put on notice of the accomplice liability issue at 
trial, sua sponte raised and answered the question of whether it 
could in such circumstances still find guilt on an accomplice 
liability theory.9 
^34 Another purpose of the preservation rule is that it 
"prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic 
reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if the strategy fails." 
Tschaacrenyf 2007 UT 37, f 20. Again, the error here did not 
occur "at trial," and there is no conceivable strategic advantage 
to D.B. by not raising the issue after the matter had already 
been concluded. Thus, where the error did not occur at trial and 
none of the purposes of the preservation rule are applicable 
here, I do not agree that the preservation rule prevents our 
review of the issue on appeal. Cf. ABCO Enters, v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 2009 UT 36, M 8-12, 211 P.3d 382 (refusing to apply 
the preservation rule because none of the situations where the 
rule was applicable were present in the case). 
8. (...continued) 
far beyond what the Gonzales court ruled. Gonzales simply 
provides that the State need not specifically state its intention 
to pursue an accomplice liability theory in the information, see 
id. f 9, and that "a person charged with a crime has adequate 
notice of the possibility of accomplice liability being raised at 
trial because conviction of accomplice and principal liability do 
not require proof of different elements or proof of different 
quality, " id. % 12 (emphases added) . But there is nothing in 
Gonzales that supports the trial court's interpretation that a 
defendant is not entitled to any notice before or during trial 
that an accomplice liability theory is being advanced. Rather, 
as discussed above, a defendant is entitled to some notice at 
trial and cannot be convicted under an accomplice liability 
theory that was never argued or advanced by the evidence--a point 
that the State apparently concedes. Accordingly, I believe that 
basing guilt on accomplice liability without D.B. receiving 
notice of that theory being pursued at trial was clear error by 
the trial court. 
9. I also note that any objection at this point: would not likely 
have made the trial court reconsider its decision because, in 
light of the arguments advanced at trial and the lack of notice 
regarding an accomplice liability theory, D.B.'s counsel was 
probably not prepared with any additional authority or an 
alternate reading of Gonzales to argue against the trial court's 
decision. 
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C. A Postjudgment Motion 
H35 According to the lead opinion, the third of D.B.'s "several 
opportunities" to object was to submit a postjudgment motion. It 
is true that in some unique situations an issue not preserved at 
trial may be preserved if the trial court considers and rules on 
the issues raised in a postjudgment motion. However, I do not 
believe the case before us is one such situation. The situations 
referenced by the lead opinion appear to be limited to those 
where motions to suppress evidence were not timely filed five 
days prior to trial, resulting in a waiver from which the trial 
court is specifically authorized to grant relief under the rules 
of criminal procedure. See State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 265-
66 (Utah 1992) .10 Thus, in those instances it is not the 
postjudgment motion that preserves the issue for appeal; rather, 
the issue is preserved because the trial court has chosen to 
address the suppression issue and because the trial court is 
specifically authorized to grant relief from a defendant's waiver 
of such suppression issues. 
f36 Generally, a postjudgment motion itself is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal. See Sittner v. 
Schriever, 2000 UT 45, f 16, 2 P.3d 442 ("Defendants correctly 
state the general rule that failure to raise an argument before 
the trial court precludes a party from raising that argument on 
appeal. However, this rule does not require a party to file a 
post-judgment motion before the trial court as a prerequisite to 
filing an appeal." (citation omitted)); State v. Erickson, 722 
P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) ("Although [the defendant] 
did raise the issue in post-trial motions, this did not preserve 
the point for appeal."). Thus, I do not agree with the lead 
opinion's reliance on the opportunity to file a postjudgment 
motion as one of D.B.'s "several opportunities" to object to the 
application of an accomplice liability theory. Nor do I agree 
that the failure to file a postjudgment motion in any way 
supports the conclusion that the issue was not preserved for 
appeal. Simply stated, if a postjudgment motion is not necessary 
to preserve an issue for appeal, D.B.'s failure to file such a 
motion is wholly irrelevant to the preservation analysis. 
10. Additionally, these cases involve instances where the motion 
gave "the trial court the opportunity to conduct the trial 
without using the tainted evidence, and thus avoid possible 
reversal and a new trial" because it allowed the court to 
"reopen [] the trial when it held an evidentiary hearing to 
address [the] defendant's claim made in his motion to arrest 
judgment." State v. Belaard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992). In 
our case, any postjudgment motion would not have served any 
judicial economy purpose. 
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^3 7 Although the concurring opinion may be correct that there 
are several procedural rules that would allow for postjudgment 
motions to be filed in this case, there is nothing in those rules 
supporting the concurring opinion's assertion that such motions 
are both sufficient and necessary to preserve an issue for 
appeal.11 Instead, the concurring opinion supports the assertion 
that such a motion is necessary by pointing to some scenarios 
where a postjudgment motion is required to preserve for appeal an 
issue arising from the trial court's decision, specifically, 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in jury trial 
settings and challenges to the inadequacy of factual findings. 
See supra % 15. However, the concurring opinion also recognizes 
that there are situations in which a postjudgment motion is not 
necessary to preserve such an issue for appeal, specifically, 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in bench trial 
settings. See supra % 15 n.2. See generally State v. Larsen, 
2000 UT App 106, U 9 n.4, 999 P.2d 1252 (applying to a criminal 
bench trial rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which provides that in bench trials, challenges to the 
sufficiency of the evidence may be raised on appeal "'whether or 
not the party raising the question has made in the district court 
an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to 
amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new 
trial1"). Although D.B.'s asserted claim falls within none of 
the categories addressed, the related cases may nonetheless be 
instructive. From those cases it appears that whether a 
postjudgment motion is required to preserve these claims of error 
is dependent on the trial court's opportunity to address the 
issue at the time of decision. See In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, %% 61-
62, 201 P.3d 985 ("A challenge to the adequacy of the court's 
findings is notably different from a challenge to the sufficiency 
of evidence. . . . It would be superfluous to demand that a 
party challenge the evidentiary support for a court's findings 
shortly after the court articulates them. But it is quite a 
different matter and wholly necessary for a party to challenge 
and thus afford the trial court 'an opportunity to correct the 
alleged error' of inadequately detailed findings in order to 
provide for meaningful appellate review of the court's decision. 
. . . A trial court judge has the opportunity to address the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings in his or her 
judgment. But a trial judge does not have the chance to address 
the adequacy of the findings themselves, unless that issue is 
11. Further, most of those rules would allow for a new hearing 
or trial, which would only give the State a second opportunity to 
give appropriate notice and convict D.B. correctly. I see no 
authority supporting the notion that the State is entitled to a 
second bite at the apple when the lack of notice is entirely of 
ius own creation. 
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brought before him or her.") . As I have discussed above, the 
trial court had the opportunity to--and did--address the notice 
issue as it was rendering its decision. See supra % 33. 
Therefore, even under the authority cited by the concurring 
opinion, the instant case would be one in which no postjudgment 
motion was required to preserve the issue for appeal. 
[^3 8 In sum, I do not think that D.B. was required to raise an 
objection in order to preserve the error for appeal where (1) the 
error did not arise at trial, (2) requiring an objection as the 
decision was announced is not supported by the preservation rule 
or the purposes behind it, and (3) no postjudgment motion is 
necessary to preserve the issue for appeal. I would therefore 
directly address the issue D.B. raises on appeal. And 
considering the evidence and argument from trial, as properly set 
forth above, I do not think that D.B. was given adequate notice 
that the State was pursing a finding of guilt under an accomplice 
liability theory.12 I would therefore reverse the determination 
of the trial court that D.B. committed these charges of theft and 
criminal trespass. 
^ £ * — 
12. Indeed, I am not convinced that the State itself was aware 
that accomplice liability was at issue. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Monday, August 11, 2008.) 
3 (Opening introductions made.) 
4 THE COURT: Thank you, please be seated. 
5 Okay, we are scheduled to be here this 
6 morning for disposition on a trial we had, I think, 
7 two or three weeks ago. And also another trial for 
8 Allegation 6, Burglary of a Dwelling, a Second Degree 
9 Felony; and Allegation 7, Theft, a Class A 
10 Misdemeanor. Mr. Dow? 
11 MR. DOW: Your Honor, the State is ready 
12 to proceed on the trial on 6 and 7, and I understand 
13 Mr. Freestone would want to ask the Court for 
14 disposition on the prior offenses, prior to this 
15 trial. 
16 MR. FREESTONE: That's correct, Your 
17 Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. We were last here a few 
19 weeks ago on a trial on Allegations 4 and 5: Theft, a 
20 Class B Misdemeanor, and Criminal Trespass, a Class B 
21 Misdemeanor. And I believe the facts are these: That 
22 Mr. Jason Sessions is a worker at the Applebee's 
23 Restaurant and on or about April 14th between 7:00 and 
24 8:00 in the morning, he observed two individuals 
25 trying to break into a fence, and that fence houses a 
4 J 
trailer that contained tools and things of that 
nature. And he observed two individuals trying to 
break into the fence. They were using rocks and/or a 
pipe of some sort to try and break the padlock. They 
were unsuccessful, and, at that point, one of the 
individuals climbed the fence and got in to where the 
tool trailer was. And, at that point, commenced 
trying to break the padlock on the trailer, and the 
other boy was — appeared to be acting as a lookout. 
And he called the police and the police 
arrived at the trailer. And, at that point, found 
Joshua Mitchell inside the trailer — or inside the 
fence where the trailer was, and then on the outside, 
Dallas Bentley was outside the fence. And there have 
been a pair of bolt cutters that was identified as 
Exhibit 2, a picture of those in Exhibit 2. And they 
had been obtained somehow from the tool trailer and 
were sitting on the outside of the fence. 
I find that Mr. Sessions' testimony was 
credible. Joshua testified that both he and Dallas 
jumped the fence, and both had the tool cutter — or 
the bolt cutters in their possession. I don't find 
that was credible, not only based on the fact that Mr. 
Sessions only saw one individual climb the fence. And 
when the police arrived, there was one individual 
5 J 
1 inside the fence and one individual outside the fence. 
2 And so, I just didn't find that Joshua was credible, 
3 and that both boys jumped the fence. 
4 That doesn't end the inquiry. I am 
5 J looking at 76-2-202, which is titled Criminal 
6 Responsibility for Direct Commission or Offense or 
7 Conduct of another. And that statute states: "Every 
8 person acting with the mental state required for the 
9 commission of an offense, who directly commits the 
10 offense or solicits, requests, commands, encourages or 
11 intentionally aids another person to engage in the 
12 conduct which constitutes an offense, shall be 
13 criminally liable as a party for such conduct." 
14 Now, I have also looked at the case of the 
15 State vs. Gonzales, 56 P.3d 969 that indicates that: 
16 "Accomplice liability is not a separate offense from 
17 principal liability, so it does not require specific 
18 notice or indictment or information because it is 
19 well-settled that accomplice incur the same liability 
20 as principals." 
21 And I've also reviewed a recent case, the 
22 State of Utah vs. Ashland Marie Briggs (Phonetic) , 
23 2008 Utah 52, where the Supreme Court talked about the 
24 accomplice liabilities statute. It indicated that the 
25 State must show that an individual acted with both the 
1 intent and that the underlying offense be committed 
2 and the intent to aid the principal actor in the 
3 offense." 
4 And IT11 find that Dallas had the intent 
5 to do both of those. And did, indeed — had the 
6 intent to commit the underlying offense, and did aid 
7 the other person in committing the offense. And so, 
8 based upon the facts that I've found and the case law 
9 that I!ve — and the statutes ITve noted, I will find 
10 that Dallas Bentley did indeed commit theft of less 
11 than $300, a Class B Misdemeanor and Criminal 
12 Trespass, a Class B Misdemeanor. Now, as further his 
13 position, Ifm not sure what is being recommended at 
14 this point. 
15 MS. KIMBER: Your Honor, I do have a 
16 report, but it's also — I didn't realize we were 
17 doing to different dispositions. I'm sorry to ask 
18 that Dallas receive 30 hours of community seirvice for 
19 each incident, at this time. 
20 THE COURT: Mr. Dow? 
21 MR. DOW: Your Honor, I wasn't 
22 J anticipating doing this as well. I just have one 
23 question. Is he on probation already? 
24 MS. KIMBER: Yes. 
25 MR. DOW: I'd ask for some State detention 
?J 
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MATTHEW6BENDER 
59-301 APPEALABILITY AND REVIEWABILITY fl 59.15[3] 
Where, however, the trial court had denied a motion for new trial 
but, before an appeal had been taken, declared its dissatisfaction 
with the verdict, indicated that it would reconsider its former order 
and grant a new trial if a remittitur was not filed but did nothing 
further, the appellate court in the exercise of its discretion denied a 
petition for.a prerogative writ.17 
Use of a writ may be appropriate to review the grant of a new 
trial, following a remand, where a new trial violates the mandate.18 
[3]—Appellate Review of New Trial Decisions on Appeals From 
Judgments. . 
Although it is often desirable as a practical matter to move for a 
new trial, in order to afford the district court an opportunity to cor-
rect prejudicial error, a motion for new trial is not a prerequisite for 
an appeal from a judgment;1 and on such appeal, review may be had 
of any legal error, properly raised,2 that appears in the record, 
met each cross-assignment of error. 
We accept and consider the case as 
thus submitted/'). 
See General Motors Corp. v. 
Perry, 303 F.2d 544 (7th Cir,. 1962) 
(the writ was denied where the court 
of appeals found that the ground for 
new trial was asserted in the timely 
motion for new trial and was not ini-
tiated by the court after the ten-day 
period had run). 
17Tuggle v. Chandler, 199 F.2d 
86, 87 (10th Cir. 1952) ("The issu-
ance of the writ is within the sound 
judicial discretion of the court and 
is not a matter of right. In proper 
cases the issuance may be withheld 
even on jurisdictional questions, 
when they are reviewable on appeal. 
. . . Final disposition of the matter 
is still within the bosom of the court, 
and we cannot forecast what that 
final disposition will be/'). 
18
 See Secretary of Banking of 
Pennsylvania v. Alker, 183 F.2d 429 
(3d Cir. 1950), cert denied, 340 U.S. 
917, 71 S. Ct. 351, 95 L. Ed. 633 
(1951); H 59.16, infra. 
For related discussion, see 
U 110.26, infra. 
1
 fl 59.14, supra. 
Woods v. National Life & Ace. 
Ins. Co., 347 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 
1965). 
2
 While Rule 46 makes formal ex-
ceptions to rulings or order of the 
court unnecessary, it does require a 
party, as a general proposition, to 
make known the action which he de-
sires trie court to taKie or nis objec-
tion to the action of the court and 
his grounds therefor. 1J 46.02, supra; 
also H 59.08[2], 59.14, supra. 
On the necessity to make objec-
tions to instructions, see ^ 51.04, 
59.08[2], supra. 
(Rel.82-6/89 Pub.410) 
E 59 KEW TRIALS; AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENTS 59-302 
whether the action be a jury or court action.3 In a trial to the court, 
the scope of review also includes the facts, but the trial court's find-
ings of fact are not to be set aside by the appellate court unless 
clearly erroneous.4 
However, a motion for a new trial is a prerequisite to appeal when 
the relief is sought on the basis of matter not appearing in the re-
cord, such as newly discovered evidence,5 which is within the scope of 
a motion for a new trial.6 Such a motion usually must first be made 
in the district court.7 And, in jury actions, other examples come to 
mind, as where relief is sought on the ground that the jury has been 
tampered with or because of jury misconduct.8 
Since the record already contains the testimony adduced at trial, a 
motion for new trial involving the evidence is not necessary for the 
purpose of bringing it into the record. But if relief from a verdict is 
desired on the ground that it is against the weight of the evidence9 or 
that the damages awarded by the verdict are inadequate or exces-
sive,10 a motion for a new trial is necessary to raise these matters. 
3
 fl 59.14, supra. See also % 59.07, 
supra. 
See Taylor v. Washington Termi-
nal Co., 409 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 
1969), citing Treatise, cert denied, 
396 U.S. 835, 90 S. Ct. 93, 24 L. Ed. 
2d 85 (1969). 
I n a court action, requests for 
findings are not necessary for pur-
poses of review, nor is an objection 
to findings or a motion to amend 
them a prerequisite to appellate re-
view. UK 52.10, 52.11[4], supra. 
4U 52.0311], supra. 
5<\\ 59.08[3], supra. 
6
 If 59.07, supra, as to court ac-
uruuLisI 11 <JC7.\JO. AUJUIU. I%& UJ JLU-J' tac-
t i o n s . 
7 ffl 59.03, 59.05[5], 59.09[5], sup-
ra. 
See Miller v. Delaware, L. & W. 
R.R., 241 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1957). 
For discussion of such a motion 
during the pendency of the appeal 
and the appellate court's disposition 
of it, see U 59.09[5], supra. 
sSee^ 59.08[4],«ttpra. 
9#eeU 59.08[5], supra. 
10See U 59.0S[6], supra. 
See Carlton v. H.C. Price Co., 640 
F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981). In a per-
sonal injury action, the court of ap-
peals found that defendant appel-
lants' contention that damage 
awards had been excessive was prop-
erly before it. An oral motion for a 
new trial is sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement that a motion for a new 
trial be made _s a prerequisite to 
appellate review of excessive dam-
ages because the purpose of the re-
quirement is to allow the trial court 
to exercise its discretion as to 
whether the particular issue should 
be redetermined before a new jury. 
Although the court could not pre-
sume that an oral motion had been 
made on the basis of defendant ap-
(Rd 82-6/89 Pub 410) 
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' LexisNexis* 
§ 46.02[1] MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3D 46-4 
§ 46.02 Parties Must Make Objections Known to Court 
[1] Objection Requirement Permits Court to Correct Error 
Rule 46 makes it unnecessary for a party to take a formal exception to a ruling or 
order of the court. The thrust of the rule is to do away with the formal machinery of 
objecting for the record every time the court enters an adverse ruling. However, Rule 
46 requires that a party make any objections to a ruhng or order of the court known 
to the court at the time the action is taken.1 This Rule has a clear notice function. The 
purpose of the Rule 46 requirement is to allow the court an immediate opportunity to 
reconsider its action and con'ect any error.2 Since the failure to object to an action by 
the court will generally preclude appellate review of that action {see [2], below), a 
party is not permitted silently to await a favorable outcome and then assert objections 
to previous trial court actions if the outcome is not favorable.3 
1
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 46. 
2
 Allows court to correct error. 
1st Circuit Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 717 R2d 622, 629 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(purpose of Rule 46 is to inform court of possible errors and allow 
opportunity for correction). 
2d Circuit Ginett v. Computer Task Group, Inc., 11 F.3d 359, 361 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing 
Moore's, court observed that Rule 46 is intended to inform court of 
litigant's position and permit it to correct any error). 
5th Circuit Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541, 552 (5th Cir. 
1968) ("The purpose of Rule 46 is to inform the trial judge of possible 
errors so that he may have an opportunity to reconsider his ruling and make 
any changes deemed advisable"). 
11th Circuit Woods v. Burlington N. R.R., 768 F.2d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd 
on other grounds, 480 U.S. 1, 107 S. Ct. 967. 94 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987); 
Brookhaven Landscape & Grading Co. v. J.F. Barton Contracting Co., 676 
R2d 516, 523 (11th Cir. 1982) ("The purpose of Rule 46 is to inform the 
trial judge of possible errors so that he may have an opportunity to consider 
his ruling and make changes when available"). 
3
 Party may not silently await favorable outcome. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 
310 U.S. 150, 238-239, 60 S. Ct. 811 (1940) (counsel "cannot as a rule remain silent, interpose no 
objections, and after a verdict has been returned seize for the first time on the point that the comments to 
the jury were prejudicial"). 
4tn circuit Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941, 949 (4th Cir. 1987) (party cannot silently 
wait and take chance of favorable verdict and then complain when it is 
unfavorable). 
5th Circuit Lange v. Schultz, 627 F.2d 122, 126-127 (5th Cir. 1980) (appellate, review 
barred when plaintiff admitted he made conscious choice not to object 
before submission of action to jury). 
6th Circuit Curmingham v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 854 F.2d 914, 916 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(party cannot gamble on favorable result and, if disappointed, claim error 
on facts previously known to party). 
11th Circuit Woods v. Burlington N. R.R., 768 F.2d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd 
(Rcl 157-3^2008 Pub 410) 
46-3 OBJECTING TO A RULING OR ORDER § 40.01 
§ 46.01 Text of CIMI Pnlt 4tt» 
Rule 46. Objecting to a Ruling -r Oi tki 
A formal exception to a ruling or order is unnecessdr} V\ ben the miing or order is 
requested or made, a party need only state the action that it wants the court to take or 
objects to, along with the grounds for the request or objection Failing to object does 
not prejudice a party who had no ooportunity to do so when the ruling or order was 
made [Adopted 1937 last amended Apul 10 2007 cffectne Decrmbct 1 200"} 
(Rei 15~3°00S Put*, 10 
§ 59.55 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 3D 59-150 
§ 59.55 Motion for New Trial Not Required in Order to Appeal Underlying 
Judgment 
A motion for a new trial is not required to preserve properly made objections 
for appellate review, and is therefore not a prerequisite to an appeal from theJ 
judgment.1 However, although not a prerequisite to an appeal, it is often advisable 
to bring the alleged errors to the trial court's attention by moving for a new trial, 
to avoid the time and expense of an appeal before a new trial ordered by the 
appellate court. Any ground for new trial that is reviewable for abuse of discretion 
should be presented to the trial court for the exercise of that discretion. Grounds 
for new trial that arise solely in the context of post trial proceedings must be 
presented to the trial court for consideration by a motion for new trial, and the 
failure to do so deprives the appellate court from any record that is reviewable for 
error. 
Co., 129 F.3d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1997) (although denial of Rule 59(e) motion is ordinarily reviewed 
for abuse of discretion, if motion seeks reconsideration of grant of summary judgment, review will 
be de novo). 
5th Circuit Fletcher v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 2000) (although decision 
on Rule 59(e) motion is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, it 
will be reviewed de novo if motion was brought solely to obtain 
reconsideration of summary judgment on merits; in such case, it is 
clear that appellant intends to appeal merits of underlying decision). 
6th Circuit Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 
1998) (although denial of Rule 59(e) motion is ordinarily reviewed for 
abuse of discretion, if motion seeks reconsideration of grant of 
summary judgment, review will be de novo); National Leadburners 
Health & Welfare Fund v. O.G. Kelley & Co., Inc., 129 F.3d 372, 374 
(6th Cir. 1997) (although denial of Rule 59(e) motion is ordinarily 
reviewed for abuse of discretion, if motion seeks reconsideration of 
grant of summary judgment, review will be de novo). 
1
 Rule 59 motion not prerequisite to appeal. Elmore v. United States, 843 F.2d 1128, 1131, n.7 
(8th Cir. 1988) (citing Moore's); Sherrill v. Royal Indus., Inc., 526 F.2d 507, 509 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975) 
(citing Moore's). 
(Rel. 156-12/2007 Pub 410) 
